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Abstract
For over a century, wildlife in Southern Africa has come under the exclusive
management of states, which tends to centre on the exclusion of local communities from
wildlife areas. In many cases, this approach has led to the hostility of wildlife
management policies by excluded communities. This widespread dissatisfaction has
caused a paradigm shift in conservation thinking towards a more community-based
conservation (CBC) approach. A major assumption of this new approach is that
providing socio-economic benefits on a sustainable basis to formerly excluded
communities will result in conservation. Indeed, some advocates of this management
regime have stressed community incorporation and inclusion as the only path to
conservation. As a result, numerous CBC initiatives have been implemented throughout
the African sub-region over the past ten years with varied success.
As there is no alternative to the CBC concept that attempts to enhance all three
elements, namely the economic, social and biological components, of the sustainable
development premise in conservation areas, it is imperative to ensure that CBC
initiatives are monitored and evaluated in order to determine what the recurring
problems and challenges are in implementing and running such initiatives so as to
achieve the three sustainable development goals. By establishing what these recurring
challenges are during the implementation process, a broad framework of necessary
principles, criteria, pre-requisites and co-requisites can be established to guide future
CBC initiatives.
The purpose of this study is to identify the successes, challenges and problems that have
either enhanced or detracted from the socio-economic and biological elements of CBC
initiatives during the implementation processes of different projects. Previous
documented project examples from around the sub-region, as well as two case study
examples of CBC initiatives in KwaZulu-Natal, namely the Mabaso Community Game
Reserve and the Usuthu Gorge Community Conservation Area, are used in this thesis to
best determine how to enhance the social and economic elements of the sustainable
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development premIse III order to achieve, in theory, the biological components
necessary for a successful conservation strategy.
The findings within this study, from the case study examples and secondary research,
show that there are several recurring challenges and problems shared by initiators of
CBC initiatives throughout the sub-continent. Issues include long project
implementation periods due to government bureaucracy, planning procedures and the
necessity to gain community support; debates over devolution of authority to local
municipalities or tribal authorities; the risks of elite capture and/or the free rider concept
whereby individuals do not change their hunting practices despite communal benefits
accruing from wildlife conservation; community participation and benefit distribution;
as well as the need to have clear communication channels between the community and
the project implementers.
The main conclusions drawn from this study emphasise several needs necessary for
making CBC initiatives sustainable for the long term. Firstly, CBC initiatives need to
conserve as well as create a variety of different ways for communities to earn a living
and to minimise any disruption by CBC projects of pre-existing livelihood strategies
carried out by local residents. Secondly, there needs to be a provision of outside
assistance to facilitate local projects and to ensure the development of the necessary
skills for local communities to eventually take on the initiatives themselves. Thirdly,
clearly defined property rights, as well as conflict resolution mechanisms and the
enforcement of any rules and regulations are further crucial criteria. Fourthly, it is
important for communities to avoid exploitation and to maximise any benefits accruing
from private investors utilising local community resources by developing favourable
legal contracts. Fifthly, it was found that the inclusion of tribal structures in both the
case study examples increased the trust and feeling of ownership by the respective
communities. Finally, it was found that CBC projects require specific locations and the
right criteria to be in place for their successful implementation. Not all communities or
communal areas meet these criteria, which is why CBC should be seen more as an


































Community Based Natural Resource Management
Communal Areas Management Programme for
Indigenous Resources
Communal Land Rights Bill.
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism
Department for International Development.




Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation
Ingonyama Trust Act
International Union for the Conservation of Nature and
Natural Resources (World Conservation Union).
KwaZulu-Natal
Lake Mburo National Park
Luangwa Integrated Development Project














List of Abbreviations VI
Table of Contents ···· .. · ······· ·.. VII
List of Figures IX
List of Tables IX
Appendix A: Maps IX
Appendix B: Plates IX
Chapter One. Introduction
1.1. Conceptual Overview: Conservation and Development 1
1.2. Strengths and Weaknesses of Community Conservation 6
1.3. Aims and Objectives of Study 8
1.4. Outline of Dissertation 11
Chapter Two. Conceptual Overview
2.1. Development Theory and Community Conservation 12
2.2. Community Conservation and Sustainable Development 13
2.3. Sustainable Development: The Sustainable Livelihood Approach 15
2.4. Sustainable Development: The Economic Element 17
2.5. Sustainable Development: The Socio-Cultural Element 22
Chapter Three. Towards Successful CBC Projects: Criteria and Case Studies
3.1. DEAT's Principles and Criteria for Successful CBNRM projects 27
3.2. Ostrom's Criteria for Successful CBNRM Projects 29
3.3.1. Nature-based Tourism: Issues of Sustainable Development 30
3.3.2. Benefit Distribution: The Free-Rider Concept 33
3.3.3. Devolution: Local Municipality vrs Tribal Authority 35
3.3.4. Community Participation and Elite Capture 37
3.3.5. The Private Sector and Community-Based Conservation 38
3.3.6. Long-term Sustainability of CBC Initiatives .41
3.3.7. Competing Social Development Choices in Conservation Areas .44
3.4. Research Questions 45
Chapter Four. Methodology and Case Study Over-View
4.1. Case Studies: Advantages and Disadvantages .47
4.2. The Process ofIdentifying Case Studies for the Research Project .48






4.5. Overview of the Case Study Region 53
Chapter Five. Mabaso Community Game Reserve (MCGR): Project Analysis
5.1. Introduction 56
5.2. MCGR: Historical Overview 56
5.3. MCGR: Institutional Structures 59
5.4. MCGR Community Awareness and Consensus Building Phase 61
5.5. Government Support and Approval Phase 61
5.6. Partner Identification Phase and Project Construction and Operations Phase 64
5.7.1. Barriers to Implementation and Sustainability 66
5.7.2. Political Tension as a Barrier to Implementation 66
5.7.3. Communal vrs Individual Tenure as a Barrier to Implementation 69
5.7.4. Democracy and Gender Inequality as Barriers to Implementation 70
5.7.5. Communication as a Barrier to Implementation 71
5.7.6. Government Bureaucracy as a Barrier to Implementation 73
5.7.7. Donor Dependence as a Barrier to Implementation 74
5.8.1. MCGR: Towards Economic Sustainability 76
5.8.2. MCGR: Towards Sustainable Livelihood Strategies 78
5.9. Summary 80
Chapter Six. Usuthu Gorge Community Conservation: Project Analysis
6.1. Introduction 81
6.2. UGCCA: Historical Overview 81
6.3. UGCCA: Institutional Structures 82
6.4. UGCCA: Project Implementation Successes and Challenges 83
6.5. UGCCA: Toward Social Sustainability 86
6.6.1. UGCCA: Toward Sustainable Livelihood Strategies 87
6.6.2. Providing Resources for Alternative Livelihood Strategies 87
6.6.3. Expanding Activities within the CBC Project 88
6.6.4. Building Skills in the Community 89
6.7. UGCCA: Toward Economic Sustainability 89
6.8. Summary 91
Chapter Seven. Summary and Conclusion
7.1. Summary 93
7.2. Future Predictions 98
7.3. Further Research and Limitations of Study 99
7.4. Conclusion 101
References ·.. ··· .. ··· .. ·.. ··· .. ·.. · · · 102
VIII
List of Figures
Figure 1. The Three Main Concepts of Sustainable Development .4
Figure 2. The Livelihoods Framework 16
Figure 3. The Economic Benefit of Wildlife 17
Figure 4. The Economic Cost of Wildlife 18
Figure 5. Bames' Model: Different Wildlife and Rangeland Uses 20
Figure 6. Project Process Map for the MCGR 58
Figure 7. MCGR Institutional Structure 59
List of Tables
Table 1. The Seven Key Principles Necessary for a Successful CBNRM Programme 27
Table 2. Ostrom's Design principles for sustaining common property institutions ..... 30
Appendix A: Maps
Figure 8. Appendix A. Site Map ofMaputoland 108
Figure 9. Appendix A. Map of Study Area 109
Figure 10.Appendix A. Map ofMCGA 110
Appendix B: List of Plates
Plate 1. The Mabaso Tribal Court House 111
Plate 2. Ilala Leaf (Hyphaene Coriacea) Products 111




1.1. Conceptual Overview: Conservation and Development
"It is both futile and an insult to the poor to tell them that they must remain in poverty
to protect the environment" (World Commission on the Environment and
Development, 1987, in Hulme and Murphree, 2001: 1).
"Nature, like taste, is subjective. In the broadest sense, nature means the realm of
animals and plants. But does it mean, as many Western cultures would have it, the
absence ofhuman activity?" (Western, 1989: 158, in Goldman, 2003: 845).
It is argued that community involvement through the ownership, management and
distribution of economic benefits amongst local communities living in and around
conservation areas is what is needed not only to conserve the environment more
effectively, but also to actively enhance rural community livelihood strategies through
the provision of alternative sources of income, usually through pro-poor tourism
initiatives connected with national parks and game reserves. The Department for
International Development (DFID) defines pro-poor tourism as 'tourism that
generates net benefits for the poor' (Poultney and Spenceley, 2001: 2). This concept,
which is often referred to as the community-based conservation (CBC) approach, is a
paradigm shift in conservation thinking aimed at resolving both the need to conserve
the environment and benefit local communities.
The concept of community conservation ties in with the main theme of the recent 5th
World Parks Congress held in Durban South Africa in September 2003. The theme of
the conference was 'Benefits Beyond Boundaries' (The World Conservation Union,
2003: 1). This theme highlighted the need for rural communities on the periphery of
reserves to gain economic benefits from national parks, and is particularly relevant to
Africa, as many African communities once occupied the lands that have been gazetted
for conservation purposes on the continent. These communities have historically not
always benefited from the revenues that such reserves have subsequently generated
through tourism and other activities. Poverty rates in such communities tend to be
high, and when resources are exhausted in communal areas the community cannot
usually utilise natural resources located within adjoining protected areas. This causes
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resentment of communities against the existence of protected areas (Hulme and
Murphree, 1999). This combination of poverty and resentment towards national parks
has detrimental effects on conservation efforts, as people will not care for
conservation principles if they stand in the way of enhancing economic gains. Thus
incidences of trespassing, poaching and over grazing in and around protected areas,
defined as illegal acts, will continue unless communities start to benefit from national
parks. Such activities reflect the lack of recognition afforded to gazetted areas by
communities used to informal community rights. There are numerous examples of
conservation areas around the sub-region of Africa that have, and still are,
experiencing high levels of resentment by local communities. For example, the Lake
Mburo National Park (LMNP) in Uganda, has had a history of conflict between
previously removed residents forced off the reserve's land and the Ugandan Wildlife
Authority (UWA), exemplified by the observation that in the early 1990's at meetings
between park staff and community members both sides regularly turned up with
firearms (Hulme and Infield, 2001: 110). The CBC concept argues that economic
benefits from reserves like LMNP, such as job creation through tourism ventures
involved with wildlife-viewing and safari hunting operations, as well as revenue
sharing schemes from national park profits, may be the incentive needed for local
communities to adopt conservation practices and eliminate their apparent need to
participate in illegal activities.
There are many definitions of conservation. All of these imply 'maintaining,
enhancing or using sustainably the biological component of an ecosystem or
biodiversity' (Kangwana, 2001: 257). Biodiversity is defined as the 'composition of
natural variation found in genes, species, communities and ecosystems' (Wilson,
1989: 261). The high economic value ofbiodiversity, and the need to maintain it for
the benefit of present and future generations, provides a major justification for
conservation (Emerton, 2001: 209). The new CBC concept goes one step further than
this by suggesting that if conservation areas are capable of generating economic
benefits, over and above potential costs for local communities, and communities
subsequently adhere to conservation principles, then conservation can be utilised as a
potential policy tool towards sustainable rural development. The South African
government has consequently adopted such a policy outlook, by declaring a target of
placing eight percent of the country's land under 'peoples conservation,' as part of a
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drive to expand benefits of protected areas into economIC development and job
creation to communities beyond national park boundaries (Macleod, 2003: 4).
The term 'peoples conservation' ties in with the paradigm shift that has occurred in
conservation over the last twenty years and that has culminated in the development of
the community conservation concept. Conservation efforts are slowly moving away
from the old "fortress" style ways of managing conservation areas in Africa (Adams
and Hulmes, 2001: 10). Fortress conservation is characterised by the state centric
'fences and fines' initiative that involves the exclusion of people as residents within
protected areas and their prevention, usually by state run Wildlife Departments such
as the UWA, of consumptive use of resources in reserves (Adams and Hulme, 2001:
10). Community conservation is defined as 'those principles and practices that argue
that conservation goals should be pursued by strategies that emphasize the role of
local residents in decision making about natural resources' (Adams and Hulme, 2001:
13). The emphasis in many community conservation initiatives is on devolving some
measure of tenurial rights over natural resources and developing the capacity of
community level institutions to have legally recognised, democratic and technically
functioning systems to manage and to distribute benefits from natural resources
(Anstey and De Sousa, 2001: 195).
This community conservation approach is based on the sustainable development
premise that if local people participate in wildlife management and economically
benefit from this participation, then in theory a 'win-win' situation will arise, whereby
wildlife and biodiversity is conserved at the same time as community welfare
improves (Emerton, 2001: 208). Lewellen (1995: 207) points out that sustainable
development, however, is a complex concept that implies the integration of three






Figure 1: The Three Main Concepts of Sustainable Development (after Lewellen,
1995: 207).
Lewellen (1995,207) further states that:
The biological goals include genetic diversity, productivity and the resilience
to thrive under changing conditions. The economic system strives toward
increased production of goods and services, the satisfaction of basic needs, the
reduction of poverty, and increased equity. Social system goals might include
cultural diversity, social diversity, social justice, popular participation in
politics, and increased gender equality.
Community conservation, in order to gain support from all the stakeholders involved,
such as the local community, donor funding non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
as well as local and national government, needs to incorporate and enhance all three
sustainable development elements in order to achieve success as a grassroots
approach to development. The concept of sustainable development within community
conservation is discussed in more detail in Chapter Two.
The CBC approach has a broad spectrum of implementation methods, highlighted by
Barrow and Murphree (2001), which aim to accrue benefits toward local communities
surrounding conservation areas. At one end of the spectrum are outreach programs
that seek to establish the biological integrity of national parks and reserves by
working to educate and benefit local communities and enhance the role of protected
areas in local plans. In the middle of the spectrum lie collaborative management
techniques that seek to create joint agreements between local communities or groups
of resource users and conservation authorities for negotiated access to natural
resources, such as joint ventures with private tour operators in tourism projects within
4
reserves. At the opposite end of the spectrum, are community-based conservation
projects that aim to devolve sustainable management decisions over resources to local
communities (Barrow and Murphree, 2001: 31). The latter will form the main focus of
this research.
Community conservation introduces the possibility of diversifying or substituting land
uses, such as subsistence agriculture or cattle rearing in communal land areas, and can
be regarded as a community empowerment tool through revenues generated by
sustainable eco-tourism ventures. Eco-tourism is defined as 'ecologically sustainable
tourism that fosters environmental and cultural understanding, appreciation and
conservation' that 'places great stress on development, participation, commitment and
control from local people' (Green and Sibisi, 2001: 50). Revenues from such projects
can then theoretically be ploughed back into communities for developmental
purposes. Such an alternative land use is often seen as the only viable option for
enhancing certain communities, especially in remote rural areas that are far beyond
the reach, cares and concerns of local district councils.
Several rural communities in South Africa, such as the Mabaso Tribal Authority and
Mathenjwa Tribal Authority (MTA) in South Africa's KwaZulu-Natal province,
which make up the case study examples for this thesis, have bought into the concept
of the CBC approach in the hope of gaining potential economic benefits through eco-
tourism ventures, and are subsequently converting communal land into wildlife
conservation areas with the help of various government and non-governmental
organisations (NGOs). The role of Tribal Authorities and their structures are outlined
in more detail in Chapter Five. The challenge for all the stakeholders involved is to
ensure that these attempts to use conservation as an empowerment tool satisfy the
dualistic aims of the new community conservation paradigm, that is conservation and
equitable community development.
The new conservation paradigm is often implemented through individual Community
Based Conservation (CBC) projects. For these projects to work several co-requisites
need to be in place. Firstly, there needs to be economic incentives, 'the assumption
being that rural people will not sustainably manage wildlife and wild land uses unless
they are perceived to yield greater returns than other forms of land uses such as crop
5
growmg and cattle rearing' (Barrow and Murphree, 2001: 34). Secondly, the
devolution of authority and responsibility to communities needs to occur in order to
create an incentive framework favouring sustainable resource utilisation. Thirdly, the
managerial responsibilities of these entitlements should allow communities to
effectively control resource use, and distribute benefits to their membership, as well
as efficiently exploit opportunities in the natural resource market (Barrow and
Murphree, 2001 :34).
A further co-requisite is the need to create an enabling legal and policy context for
local people to manage their resources sustainably, as well as to encourage the
development of wildlife stocks, safari-hunting and tourism in communal or tribal
lands in order to establish alternative revenue creating opportunities for communities
in such areas (Barrow and Murphree, 2001: 34). Institutions, namely rules and
regulations, for the effective local management of natural resources must be
established by the local communities themselves, and benefits must accrue to the
community on a sustainable and equitable basis if projects are to be successfully
implemented (Barrow and Murphree, 2001: 34).
1.2. Strengths and Weaknesses of Community Conservation
The International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
(ruCN) has identified six major arguments in favour of the new conservation
approach through CBC projects. Firstly, the new approach is necessary due to the lack
of efficacy and economic unsustainability of the fortress conservation methods,
brought about by high incidences of poaching and local resentment towards reserves,
inherited from the colonial era. Secondly, it is important to enhance and conserve
natural resources in communal areas where large proportions of the population live.
Thirdly, it is vital to provide economic incentives for local people to use resources in
a sustainable manner. Fourthly, the potential viability of common property
management regimes, which are described in more detail later on in this chapter, need
to be enhanced. Fifthly, there is growing evidence of greater efficacy of bottom-up
approaches to rural development. Finally, the new conservation approach, with its
emphasis on community involvement, provides redress for the injustice of the forced
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removals through which protected areas were first created, especially in Southern
Africa (The World Conservation Union, 2003: 2).
According to the ruCN, in spite of the potential benefits of community conservation,
real success stories of the new approach remain somewhat isolated (The World
Conservation Union, 2003: 3). Six main criticisms of the CBC approach have been
identified by the ruCN. Firstly, it has been found that community conservation has
generated lower economic benefits for local people than originally anticipated.
Campbell and Vainio-Mattila (2003) for example, found that in Zambia's Luangwa
Integrated Development Project (LIRDP) only eleven percent of the local community
members gained direct employment in safari operations. As a result of lower expected
economic benefits it is likely that fewer incentives for conservation have occurred.
However, it can be counter-argued that something is better than nothing, and that
community conservation is by far a better alternative then the previous fortress
conservation techniques that employed fewer community members. Secondly, largely
as a consequence of poor incentives, there is a lack of evidence of positive impacts on
conservation. Thirdly, many community projects have naIve assumptions about the
coherence of rural communities, often assuming that communities are homogenous in
terms of the benefits they derive from their surrounding environments. Fourthly,
community-based conservation schemes often underestimate the difficulties of joint
decision-making problems in developing strong and effective local institutions.
Political commitment to the devolution of decision-making powers is often hard to
gain. Additionally, the capture of benefits by bureaucrats in intermediate institutions
has also been found to be a big problem. Finally, arguments exist that conservation
and rural development are essentially incompatible, in that development often leads to
detrimental practices in terms of conservation (The World Conservation Union, 2003:
3). Development is often measured in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), in
other words the amount of output of goods and services a country produces. Increases
in GDP often require increases in resource use, such as raw materials that are often
finite in nature. Subsequently, improvements in development are often associated with
deterioration of natural resources, for example the loss of biodiversity often occurs
due to expansions in agriculture. Community conservation attempts to counter this
criticism by incorporating notions of sustainable development into its ideology and
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finding ways of enhancing conservation efforts without detracting from rural
livelihood strategies.
There is also an argument that the new CBC concept in terms of conservation has an
over-emphasised focus at the local level. The CBC approach assumes that the destiny
of parks and conservation within communal areas lies in the hands of local people.
According to Wilshusen et al (2002: 29) CBC initiatives do not take into account the
fact that local people are only a minor part of a much broader picture, whereby remote
communities are strongly influenced by decisions of the central government and
conditions determined by it, such as the construction of roads; availability of rural
credit; subsidies, and tax incentives; raising or lowering trade barriers and laws
governing labour practices. Against such powerful macro-economic forces, it is
argued that any attempts by CBC initiatives to encourage conservation would simply
pale into insignificance. This may be the case, but as the following aims and
objectives of this study point out if the CBC concept does not sufficiently address
biodiversity protection it would be a mistake either to assume that we have nothing to
learn from the approach or that it should be tossed out as a policy tool.
1.3. Aims and Objectives of Study
Community conservation initiatives in communal lands are being promoted as an
important tool for empowering local communities in rural areas around South Africa.
Whether it is an effective and efficient tool for both development and conservation
goals is a highly debated and contentious issue. Questions of whether CBC is more
equitable, more efficient, more conservatory and more developmental than
alternatives need to be answered (Hulme and Murphree, 2001: 281). However, it can
be counter-argued that a return to older authoritarian protectionist strategies to
achieve conservation would suggest that nothing has been learnt from past failures
and would be tantamount to reinventing the "square wheel" (Wilshusen et al. 2002:
19). The debate needs to move on from whether the new community-conservation
premise is an economically, socially and biologically viable solution, to finding ways
that will ensure that the idealism of the community conservation approach becomes a
sustainable working reality. It is for this reason that this study focuses on identifying
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and determining necessary criteria essential for ensunng the successful
implementation of CBC initiatives.
Foggin and Munster (2000:7) emphasise that in many rural areas, where there is
extensive poverty, and few prospects for substantial economic development, nature
conservation in conjunction with tourism development does not represent an
opportunity cost, but a means of contributing to the alleviation of rural poverty. The
opportunity cost of conservation can be defined as the opportunity forgone to use the
land and resources for other purposes. The argument therefore is not whether
community conservation works, but how best to ensure that the new concept works
sustainably, efficiently and equitably to simultaneously alleviate poverty and enhance
conservation.
Adams and Hulme (2001) point out that the achievement of the counter-narrative to
fortress conservation is not that it has proved that community conservation works;
rather it is that it has created the space for a set of community conservation
experiments that take many forms and are achieving very different results.
Community conservation projects, therefore, require intensive monitoring and study
so that the knowledge created from them can be fed back into policy that can be acted
on to make future projects more effective (Adams and Hulme, 2001: 24). It is
important that agencies and individuals engaged in policy and implementation of
community conservation approaches respond to the many valid criticisms which have
been levelled at CBC projects, by analysing and understanding the many problems
and challenges which exists, and then develop appropriate approaches, policies and
programmes able to meet these challenges (The World Conservation Union, 2003:3).
The experiences of community conservation initiatives in Southern Africa so far,
mainly through the process of trial and error, have led to the identification of a
growing number of broad criteria deemed necessary to ensuring the sustainable
success of community conservation initiatives.
As such, the first main aim of this thesis is to introduce and describe the cases under
study, namely the Usuthu Gorge Community Conservation Area (UGCCA) and the
Mabaso Community Game Reserve (MCGR) in KwaZulu-NataI, in order to further
document examples of CBC initiatives and determine what the key role players
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involved in the case studies perceive to be the most relevant issues necessary for the
successful implementation ofCBC initiatives. The second main objective is to identify
a thorough set of criteria deemed necessary, during the implementation phase of a
CBC initiative, for the success and long-term sustainability of community based
conservation projects. These criteria are highlighted in Chapter Three. The third aim
of this thesis is to determine whether these identified criteria for successful
implementation of CBC projects are included and practiced by the two case study
examples, because if these criteria are not included, then theoretically the two CBC
ventures in KZN are more likely to fail.
The comparative appraisal of the two emerging CBC projects in KwaZulu-Natal was
carried out in order to gain a first hand understanding of the problems, challenges,
successes, as well as other experiences encountered by the two projects through
interviews with leading players of the various different stakeholders involved with the
two projects. These experts in the CBC arena were then asked what they would
recommend is necessary to ensure the sustainable success of future projects. The
findings aim to enhance the growing broad framework of pre-requisites and co-
requisites deemed necessary to the sustainability and success of community
conservation projects in the future.
It is important to note that each case study example of a community conservation
project is unique, with its own set of inimitable problems. Where the two case study
projects do not meet all of the identified criteria for the sustainability of CBC projects,
a fourth aim will be to determine what the effects are of including or excluding
criteria on the various sustainable development elements of the projects, namely the
social, economic and biological components.
As the concept of community conservation is a relatively new phenomenon in terms
of the implementation process and running of projects, especially in South Africa, it
can be argued that there is no right or wrong way of proceeding. Each new project
brings with it a new learning curve. The more that community conservation projects
are implemented, analysed and documented, then the easier it will be to identify
related recurring themes on which to try and create a working framework to help
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guide the sustainable implementation and running of future community conservation
projects.
1.4. Outline of Dissertation
This dissertation begins with an outline of the new community-based conservation
approach. Chapter Two introduces a conceptual overview of the theory involved with
the new CBC ideology. Chapter Three highlights a list of principles and criteria,
identified from the literature, that are deemed necessary for the successful
implementation of future community conservation projects and contains case study
examples of community conservation projects through-out southern Africa. Chapter
Three also outlines the main objectives and research questions for this study. Chapter
Four is an outline of the methodology used to gather data for this research. This
chapter also introduces background information on the case study areas, namely the
Mabaso and Usuthu Gorge Community Game Reserves. Chapter Five is an analysis
of the Mabaso Community Game Reserve (MCGR) case study area and outlines some
of the successes and challenges faced during the implementation of this project.
Chapter Six provides a comparative analysis of the Usuthu Gorge Community
Conservation Area, which highlights subtle differences between its own
implementation process and that of the MCGR. Chapter Seven is the concluding
chapter summing up all the major themes and findings.
It is expected that this research will contribute to the current understanding of the new
conservation approach and its workings through CBC projects in communal lands.
The research aims to determine the problems faced and opportunities taken when
implementing and maintaining the two case study projects in KwaZulu-Natal and
comparing these experiences with those from other documented case study examples
from other parts of Southern Africa. A further objective of the thesis will be to
determine whether the case study examples have incorporated, into their project plans,
the highlighted set criteria and principles, identified in Chapters Two and Three, and





2.1. Development Theory and Community Conservation
The paradigm shift from fortress conservation to a more integrated community based
model reflects the changes that have occurred in overall development theory in the past
fifty years. In the 1950s and 1960s Modernisation theory, with its strong emphasis on state
intervention, planned industrialisation and reliance on economic growth as a tool to
transform society from predominantly traditional values to modem notions of
industrialisation, dominated development ideology. This gradually changed with a
realisation in a lot of cases of state limitations and ineffectiveness, as well as the
persistence of unequal distribution of benefits in attempts to eradicate poverty through
economic growth.
In the 1970s the development focus expanded to include a 'basic needs' approach that
aimed to attend directly to the needs of the poor (Preston, 1996: 245). Development
thinkers introduced ideas of sustainable livelihoods and acknowledged the integrated
nature of poverty reduction, which encompasses resource accessibility and management,
control over assets, markets, household incomes, health, education, gender sensitivity,
social inclusion and environmental preservation at the grass roots level (Mullen, 1999:
IX). This new development ideology conflicted with previous philosophy on development
that considered communities to be a hindrance to progressive social change. Instead the
new approach championed the role of communities in bringing about decentralization and
meaningful participation in efforts to reduce poverty through a 'bottom up' approach to
development (Gibson and Agrawal, 1999: 629).
These newer ideas, emphasising the important role that communities could play in
development, were incorporated into conservation ideology through statements of intent
on global environmental problems issued following the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio De
Janeiro. These statements strongly advocated, as solutions to development and the
sustainable utilisation of the environment, a combination of government decentralization,
devolution to local communities of responsibility for natural resources held as commons,
and community participation (Leach, Mearns and Scoones, 1999: 225). This movement
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further adopted, to some extent, the neo-liberal principles of the present day, by
emphasising the importance of markets and communal property rights as a mechanism for
communities to gain economic empowerment through conservation. This notion of
'market environmentalism' incorporates the idea that the market is the most important
mechanism for mediating between people, and regulating their interaction with the
environment (Adams, 2001: 104). Market environmentalists would argue that when
market prices rise as resources become scarce people would become more innovative and
find cheaper sources or ways of using resources more efficiently. Within such a model,
attempts by the state to create rules and regulations to control resource use will be
inefficient, and bound to fail if economic welfare is to be maximised and resources are to
be maintained at desirable levels (Adams, 2001: 104). The necessity for free markets, in
relation to communal property rights, is discussed later in this chapter.
2.2. Community Conservation and Sustainable Development
New challenges to development for developing nations emerged in the last twenty years. It
was previously assumed that developing countries were free to replicate the development
trends of developed nations by depleting the natural resources and, in the short term,
degrading the environment to generate economic growth without paying the associated
external costs (Grainger, 1997: 61). However, over the last twenty years there have been
growing calls to restrict this freedom in order to protect the global environment. The
complex concept of sustainable development emerged as a result of these concerns. One
of the original definitions presented in the Brundtland report (1987) and cited in Grainger
(1997: 63) was that 'sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.'
This definition was not socially enhancing enough, especially for developing nations, as it
was seen as perpetuating the present situation of poverty and inequality by simply using
the same resources more efficiently. As a consequence, many definitions came about to
incorporate social progression, such as the one put forward by the World Wildlife Fund
(WWF) in 1991 that defined sustainable development as a means to 'improving the quality
of life while living within the carrying capacity of supporting systems' (Mawhinney,
2002: 3). The difference between the two definitions is that one suggests remaining in the
same state, namely in poverty, for the benefit of future generations, whereby the second
definition suggests that there is room for social progression within the sustainable
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development premise and that development without jeopardising the chances of future
generations is possible so long as it is planned, implemented and controlled properly. The
older, 'greener' arguments, which saw sustainable development as concerned solely with
environmental issues, subsequently were replaced by more holistic versions with
consideration for social, economic and environmental aspects of life (Mawhinney, 2002:
3), as illustrated by the sustainable development model introduced in Figure 1 (Chapter
One). This sustainable development model provides the conceptual framework for this
study; CBC projects should focus on and attempt to enhance social, economic and
environmental facets in order to be deemed successful.
The challenge of incorporating the sustainable development model into the planning
process of a CBC project is to find ways of accommodating the social, economic and
environmental priorities that different groups of people, depending on their outlook, want
to see achieved. For example, economists would like to see economic growth in line with
healthy population growth. Environmentalists on the other hand wish to acknowledge the
constraints of nature and impose restraint on growth (Mawhinney, 2002: 11). In relation to
community conservation, some stakeholders would be determined to see an increase in the
biodiversity and conservation of areas, whilst other important players, such as the
communities involved, will want to see improvements in community welfare. The major
challenge is to balance these priorities.
Mawhinney (2002: 13) points out that the most successful strategy for sustainable
development practitioners has been through the development of a set of locally derived
indicators, and their subsequent application based on a set of locally defined targets.
Community conservation projects according to Mawhinney (2002) would need to identify
locally derived indicators to measure progress and determine a balance between the three
elements of sustainable development. Three forms of indicator should be evident.
Economic indicators might include measures of wealth such as GDP, employment, access
to credit, livelihood diversification, opportunities and profit making abilities. Social
scientists might include measures of quality of life, such as health statistics (e.g. infant
mortality rates), education and access to information. Environmental measures include
indicators showing better biodiversity and ecosystem conditions. The overall expectation
from the sustainable development model is that indicators for all three elements will
Improve.
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If one of the elements deteriorates at the expense of enhancing another element then
purists could argue that a project has failed. Mawhinney argues that it is seldom likely that
all three elements will show improvement since there are trade-offs and a perfect balance
is indefinable (2002: 17). This is not to say that the sustainable development model is an
over idealistic notion that never could be translated into reality. So long as none of the
elements deteriorate, and some indicators improve, then a perfect balance is an irrelevant
goal, and the project should therefore not be deemed a failure. A realistic goal would be to
enhance and create some form of balance between the elements in order for the project to
be deemed a success.
The three facets of the sustainable development model are irrevocably inter-related and
this linkage may encourage balance. For example, the main objectives for conservationists
who support CBC initiatives are to see the achievement of the biological component of the
sustainable development model being sustained and improved. According to the CBC
ideology, the enhancement of the biological component of the sustainable development
model is closely interrelated to the other two elements, namely the economic and social
goals. By rewarding communities economically and socially for their conservation efforts
by taking ownership of and generating benefits from CBC initiatives, communities will
have more incentives to practice conservation techniques. The enhancement of the
economic and social elements of rural people in communal lands, as a result of CBC
initiatives, should encourage communities to take a greater invested interest in seeing
CBC initiatives succeed, which will consequently enhance the biological component of
the sustainable development model. The next part of this chapter will therefore focus on
the economic and social elements of the sustainable development model, which are
deemed necessary for achieving the biological goals of the CBC concept.
2.3. Sustainable Development: The Sustainable Livelihoods Approach
The ideas and the aims of the community conservation approach tie in with the concept of
the sustainable livelihoods approach that takes a holistic view which unites concepts of
economic development, reduced vulnerability and environmental sustainability while
building on the strengths of the poor (Satge, 2002: 3). Vulnerability can be defined as 'the
characteristics that limit an individual, a household, a community or even an ecosystem's
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capacity to anticipate, manage, resist or recover from the impact of a natural or other
threat (often called a hazard or natural trigger)' (Satge, 2002: 2). The sustainable
livelihoods approach assumes that households are sustainable if their levels of assets and
capabilities are enough to avoid vulnerability. Assets are defined as the resources used for
gaining a livelihood, whilst capabilities are the combined knowledge, skills, state of health
and ability to labour or command over labour of a household (Satge, 2002: 6). Livelihood



















































H Represents human capital: the skills, knowledge, ability to labour and good
health important to the ability to pursue different livelihood strategies.
P Represents physical capital: the basic infrastructure and the production
equipment and means that enable people to pursue livelihoods.
S Represents social capital: the social resources (networks, membership of groups
etc) which people draw in pursuit of livelihoods.
F Represents financial capital: the financial resources that are available to people
and which provide them with different livelihood options
N Represents natural capital: the natural resources stocks from which resource
flows useful for livelihoods are derived (e.g. land, water and biodiversity).
Figure 2. The livelihoods framework (after Satge, 2002: 5).
If planned and implemented properly, the community conservation approach could
enhance the concept of livelihoods by improving livelihood outcomes with a beneficial,
well thought through combination of structures, namely levels of government support and
private sector investment, and processes, such as laws, policies and institutions
implemented by the communities themselves. The way that the livelihoods framework is
put into practice, through participatory planning and appreciative enquiry, can build the
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capacity of local people to lobby for appropriate policy and institutional support that
benefits them the most, thus enhancing the socio-cultural elements of the sustainable
development premise, and which is why community involvement in decision-making
through out the whole CBC project is crucial. Additionally, community conservation can
contribute to sustainable livelihood diversification through additional tourism revenues
that would not be available to communities had they not adopted the new community
conservation approach.
2.4. Sustainable Development: The Economic Element
The chance of economic growth in a community through balancing costs and benefits of
wildlife value will be used to demonstrate the economic element of CBe. The economic
rationale behind benefit-based approaches to community conservation is that communities
must benefit from wildlife if they are to be willing and able to conserve it. For this
principle to work, however, the economic benefits of wildlife conservation must exceed
the costs. Examples of wildlife benefits are illustrated in Figure 3:
I Total Economic Benefit of Wildlife I
I
~
Use Values Non-use Values
y y ~
Direct Values Indirect Values Option Values Existence Values
Wildlife products The ecological The premium The intrinsic
that can be and environmental placed on value of wildlife,
consumed services maintaining regardless of use,
directly, such as associated with wildlife such as their
live sales, meat, wildlife and its populations for cultural, aesthetic
hides, skins and habitat such as possible future and bequest
trophies; carbon uses, such as significance.
education, tourism sequestration, tourist,
and research storm protection, pharmaceutical,
activities that and climatic industrial and
create iobs. control. agricultural uses.
Figure 3. The Economic Benefit of Wildlife (after Emerton, 2001: 210)
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From an economIC perspective, direct values present the most tangible forms of
remuneration from wildlife, as they are often easier to measure and offer direct physical
benefits for individuals. The option value of wildlife is defined as the value perceived in
society of preserving the resource for possible ~ure use, whereas the existence value is
the value in simply preserving the resourc'iien though it may never be used (Barnes,
2002: 278). Both of these values are ec'onomic measurements reflected by peoples'
willingness to pay for them. Holland and Oellermann (1993), cited in Barnes (2002: 279),
found that in Southern Africa there was strong evidence of willingness to pay for wildlife
preservation among visitors to wildlife areas. It is important to note that the majority of
visitors to national parks are foreigners or locals in the higher income brackets of society.
Their willingness to pay for the non-use values of wildlife may not be shared by poor
people who live in and around conservation areas, and who need to utilise the land to
sustain a living. The willingness to pay for the non-use value of an area must therefore be
viewed as a luxury for the privileged few. If resources can be redirected from those willing
to pay for wildlife value to those who cannot pay, then the latter may change their option
value.
The potential economIC benefits of wildlife can only be used as an incentive for
community wildlife conservation if these are balanced against economic costs of wildlife
conservation. Examples of such costs are listed in Figure 4.
Total Costs to Wildlife
~ ~
Management costs Opportunity costs
Costs of equipment, Costs to other activities Alternative land, money,
capital, wages, Livestock losses, crop time or resource uses and
running costs, destruction, human profits forgone,
policing, etc injury, damage to including unsustainable
structures, etc use.
Figure 4: The Economic Cost of Wildlife (after Emerton, 2001 :217).
Wildlife benefits must at least cover direct costs for conservation to be economically
viable. It is not enough to merely allocate a fixed proportion of wildlife revenues to
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community development activities; the level and type of benefits provided must be closely
tied to the magnitude of wildlife costs accruing to communities in order for local residents
to support conservation efforts (Emerton, 2001: 220). Communities should also decide for
themselves where and in what form the revenues raised from conservation should be spent
in order to increase their support through their involvement in the decision making
process.
The opportunity cost of conservation is a very important concept for economics. It is
estimated that the opportunity cost of South Africa's Kruger National Park, measured in
terms of lost revenues from potential inhabitants capacity, potential livestock populations
and potential cultivated areas was approximately US$ 6million in the early 1990s
(Engelbrecht and Van der Walt, 1993: 114). If local communities feel that they could gain
more benefits from conservation areas through different land uses, such as agriculture or
cattle rearing, then opposition towards reserves will naturally be high. Allowing different
land uses within conservation areas at a manageable level can reduce opportunity costs
and conflicts between communities and conservation bodies.
The economic contribution of wildlife in terms of national income, employment, and
subsistence opportunities for South Africa was around US$ 40 million in 1996 (Wells,
1996). The concern for CBC approaches, therefore, is the extent to which these revenues
and benefits accrue to residents ofwildlife areas in order to reduce the opportunity costs of
reserves and initiate strong incentives for locals to collaborate in conservation initiatives.
The way in which revenues are distributed within communities is crucial; it is essential
that individuals benefit directly through shared revenues and jobs, at the same time as the
overall community benefits through public services such as schools and clinics, in order to
create both individual and communal incentives for conservation practices.
An important determinant is whether wildlife conservation can compete with commercial
and non-commercial (traditional) livestock keeping, crop growing and other land use
alternatives. According to Barnes, different land use alternatives fit within 'spatial niches,'
in which they are economically efficient, and can contribute to national income,
livelihoods and the national development process (2002: 286). Barnes found that
commercial livestock keeping needed to be near transport networks and markets to be
economically efficient, and therefore did not have the economic potential to displace
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wildlife in most remote parts of the southern Africa region (2002: 285). The economic
value of traditional livestock keeping was harder to determine, though it was recognised
that it was a very important contributor to rural livelihoods, especially in moderately
remote and less remote areas (Barnes, 2002: 285). Wildlife conservation had the highest
economic returns where non-use values were high and suited to tourism ventures; that is,
'areas with scenic and biological diversity as well as high wildlife densities' (Barnes,
2002: 281). Figure 5 highlights the hypothetical economic efficiency of different land uses
along a gradient according to their anticipated negative effects on existing biodiversity and
















Figure 5. The hypothetical spread of different wildlife and rangeland uses along a gradient
of environmental quality in Botswana, showing the relationship with likely non- use
values for wildlife (after Barnes, 2002: 285).
Figure 5 illustrates that the total economic value of the spatial mix of land uses can
feasibly be maximised if development takes place within a spectrum of land use zones in
which economic use values are optimised, while loss of non-use values are minimised
where the willingness to pay for them by tourists are high (Barnes, 2002: 286). Wildlife
can then be seen as having a complimentary, rather then competitive, role to play in
development in relation to other land uses so long as it occurs in appropriate regions that
maximise economic returns from those areas of land with high non-use values. Viljoen
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and Naicker (2000: 136) support this view by suggesting that conflict is likely to occur in
areas where local natural resource use and agricultural practices are difficult to reconcile
with nature-based tourism developments that require pristine natural environments for
success. However, in areas susceptible to drought, where grazing and agricultural
resources are poor, wildlife conservation and tourism initiatives are the most viable and
sustainable forms of land use (Viljoen and Naicker, 2000: 136).
In terms of using conservation as an upliftment strategy for communities, it is thought that
the economic goals of sustainable development can be enhanced through neo-liberal ideals
of minimal state intervention and the utilisation of markets. The argument follows that
free markets give individuals, and in this instance communities, the greatest freedom in
choosing what to produce and consume and that patterns of natural resource use (including
conservation) are best determined by market processes, which follows the dictum of 'use
it or loose it' (Hulme and Murphree, 1999: 280). This can be misconstrued as supporting
the consumption model - that a community can use a resource until it is depleted and will
then find alternative resources - which is not the case. Nuding (1999, XI) emphasises this
by arguing that conservation management can only follow often-controversial utilitarian
principles, which means that the well-being of each individual animal and plant is
important but only of secondary importance compared to the overall conservation of
species, populations, entire ecosystems and, above all, the legitimate interests of
participating people in their own development and improvement. Therefore, when
following the principle of sustainability, wildlife can be utilized like every other
renewable resource. For example, even though hunting within a natural ecosystem is not
necessary, at the same time it is not harmful as one of the options of wildlife management.
However, the main danger of utilitarian conservation management is - like any
management of resources - that the principles of sustainability might be pushed too far
(Nuding, 1999: XII).
Hulme and Murphree (1999) emphasise that wildlife areas must be exposed to a market
where their uniqueness and scarcity will lead to high economic values being placed on
them so that the likelihood of conservation is greatly enhanced. Consumers, namely
tourists, trophy hunters, and people who intrinsically value a species or habitat, will bid up
prices so that alternative uses that would degrade the environment, particularly agriculture,
will no longer be attractive to producers (Hulme and Murphree, 1999: 282).
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To create a market within a communal conservation area, means need to be found to
increase the exclusivity of the conservation area in question, in order to enhance the non-
use value of an area, and grant some rights to the stewards, namely the community, of that
good, so that they can market the environmental service, often a tourist initiative (Shilling
and Osha, 2002: 16). Any profits generated by the creation of these markets then need to
be equitably distributed to the stewards and to the community at large.
Clear communal property rights, as opposed to individual property rights over a resource,
need to be determined and enforced to ensure that markets work properly to benefit the
community. Communal property rights can be defined as a 'regime in which a defined
group collectively manages and exploits a common property resource within a defined
jurisdiction' (Jones and Murphree, 2001: 44). Shilling and Osha (2002:11) emphasise
three major characteristics of communal property rights that highlight their relevance to
conservation and community enhancement:
Firstly, common-pool property regimes tend to be larger than one individual can
afford. Secondly, there are multiple beneficiaries of the properties output. Finally,
producing that output is a result of integral functions of the property as a whole.
The desired result is that management of the property as a common unit produces more
efficient output than does division into more discrete, independently managed units.
However, the community itself must determine inherent incentives for equitable allocation
of resources (Shilling and Osha, 2002:11). Communal property rights move beyond
conventional market systems to embrace common goals and benefits, and they illustrate
the possibility of using market tools to achieve more sustainable results. There is a danger
that individual households, whilst recognising the higher value of conservation as an
alternative land use in comparison with say cattle farming, may nevertheless wish to opt
for cattle since cattle are individually owned and therefore the disposal of worth is at the
owner's sole discretion and not that of the community (Jones and Murphree, 2001: 49).
2.5. Sustainable Development: The Socio-Cultural Element
For the community conservation approach to be successful in achieving the social and
cultural elements of sustainable development, namely the empowering of communities
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through increasing their ownership and decision making responsibilities over assets and
their own progression, communities need to have a strong legal claim over resources.
Institutions, defined here as rules and regulations, then need to be created by a fair
representation of the community to best determine how to manage the communal property
regime, how revenues from the communal resource base will be equitably distributed
amongst the community, what form this will take and how the community plans to enforce
the institutions they themselves created. All these processes are designed to instil a sense
of ownership and trust within the community of CBC initiatives, which will enhance the
long-term survival of such projects by ensuring communities themselves take the lead in
controlling and determining the direction of the processes involved. If outsiders set the
terms of local people's involvement in decisions about land and resource use then
conservation goals will not be achieved because imposed community-based conservation
implies an exercise in futility (Murphree, 1994: 404, in Adams, 2001: 343).
It is critical that the establishment and implementation of rules about the use, management
and conservation of resources, and the resolution of the disputes that arise during the
interpretation and application of these rules are devolved to a local level to gain the
support of communities through ensuring that the community owns the project (Gibson
and Agrawa1, 1999: 638). Community ownership of CBC projects is crucial in helping
restore pride and enhance the self-sufficiency of communities too often seen as being
reliant on outsiders for developmental help. Additionally, notions of proprietorship and the
devolution of important management decisions over resources to the community are
imperative issues in ensuring that revenues go directly back into communities and are not
absorbed by over1y bureaucratic government, and occasionally private, systems. The
devolution of management decisions is also essential in terms of restoring some of the pre-
colonial rights that communities once had in relation to managing resources. Gibson and
Agrawal (1999: 631) point out that communities down the millennia have developed
elaborate rituals and practices to limit off take levels, restrict access to critical resources,
and distribute harvests. These are often more efficient then modem day practices. The
extent to which devolution of authority is achieved and to whom this authority is devolved
are therefore key issues in determining the success of community conservation. The
relation between community and resources is discussed in further detail in Chapter Three
using examples of CBCs such as CAMPFIRE.
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Many community based conservation projects are flawed in their characterisation of
communities and their local environments. Community conservation approaches tend to
view communities as relatively homogenous units, with members' shared characteristics -
such as language, culture, shared beliefs and geographical boundaries - distinguishing
them from outsiders (Leach, Meams and Scoones, 1999: 228). Serious attention to social
differences within communities, such as gender, wealth, age, origins and other aspects of
social identity have been neglected in the environmental policy debate (Leach, Meams and
Scoones, 1999: 229). Such characteristics divide and crosscut community boundaries and
should be included in project and research design and policy decisions.
Different members of communities will have differing impacts on the economic, social,
and conservation arenas, and subsequently, conservation efforts will have different
impacts, whether they are positive or negative, on different community members. Both
formal (such as property rights set out by governments) and informal (customary property
rights) institutions, legitimised by social norms and codes of behaviour, shape the ways in
which differentiated actors in rural communities access, use and derive well being from
environmental resources. By doing this, these institutions influence the course of
ecological change (Leach, Meams and Scoones, 1999: 241).
If certain institutions can be identified as supporting the interests of certain social actors,
or as contributing to desired courses of ecological change, then they can be targeted by
policy in strategies of institution building or support (Leach, Meams and Scoones, 1999:
243). This would imply agencies moving away from generalized community support
towards far more explicit partiality. Some people could be made worse off through a form
of institutional failure that would favour some while actually increasing poverty levels for
others within a community by denying them access to certain types of resources. Arrnartya
Sen (1989) cited in Leach, Meams and Scoones (1999: 233) refers to this as
environmental entitlement failure. Environmental entitlements refer to altemative sets of
utilities derived from environmental goods and services over which social actors have
legitimate effective command, and which are instrumental in achieving well being such as
'food, water, or fuel; the market value of such resources, or of rights to them; and the
utilities derived from environmental services, such as pollution sinks or properties of the
hydrological cycle' (Leach, Meams and Scoones, 1999: 234). The fundamental issue of
concem is how particular individuals and groups of people gain access to and control
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environmental entitlements, and how this might change if a new reserve is set up on their
communal land.
Certain institutions, both formal and informal, cause entitlement failure by not allowing
various groups access to certain resources that would enhance their well-being. For
example, women in rural areas, who traditionally collect resources such as fire wood and
grass for thatching, may be made worse off if they have to travel further to collect such
resources as a consequence of being unable to enter newly designated community
conservation reserves that they may live next to. It is important therefore that community
conservation projects do not side with particular groups or institutions within communities
and that they incorporate three critical factors about communities as identified by Gibson
and Agrawal:
Firstly, community conservation projects must identify and include all of the multiple
actors with multiple interests that make up communities. Secondly, community
conservation approaches must understand the process through which these actors
interrelate. Finally, project managers must realise the institutional arrangements that
structure their interactions and fairly include all the community players in the decision
making process, including the subordinate groups (1999: 213).
The notion of environmental sustainability is problematic gIven the diverse, partial
perspectives of different social actors. The questions are what is to be sustained and for
whom? Communities need to be seen as heterogeneous groups with different, often
conflicting needs, desires and wants from their surrounding environment. Project planners
must subsequently take all these needs and desires into account and act accordingly to
ensure that subordinate groups are heard and not made worse off at the expense of
dominant groups within communities.
An obvious direct social benefit of community conservation projects is the potential for
job creation, usually as scouts or in tourist ventures, such as safari hunting and
photographic safari operations, or in the building of infrastructure such as game fences,
roads and lodges. It is imperative that these jobs are issued in a fair and equitable manor,
avoiding issues of nepotism and elite capture amongst community members involved with
the implementation of CBC initiatives.
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As CBC initiatives are often in areas of high unemployment and offer a limited number of
jobs, the majority of which are short term positions usually involved in the building of
infrastructure, it is vitally important that CBC initiatives accrue enough income relatively
quickly to cover running costs of the project, to ensure its financial sustainability, as well
as to go towards social infrastructure development to benefit the whole community, in
order to gain their continued support for the initiative. The long term dedication of the
donor funding community is essential in this process, in terms of financial commitment, in
order to bridge the gap between projects being able to generate enough income in excess
of costs to go towards social infrastructure, and the relative speed at which communities
want to see such benefits in return for their conservation efforts. The eventual long term
aim of CBC projects is to become financially sustainable by generating enough income,
usually through tourism or the sustainable consumptive use of wildlife, to both cover
running costs of the initiative and provide funds for social infrastructure expenditure
within the community.
This chapter offers a conceptual over-view of the main theoretical issues and concerns of
implementing and running CBC initiatives. It has illustrated how the paradigm shift from
fortress conservation to community-based initiatives fits in with the overall move towards
community participation in the broader development field. The sustainable development
model in Figure 1 was subsequently re-introduced, which presents the framework and
challenge to CBC project implementers of trying to enhance the economic and cultural
elements in order sustain the biological interests of CBC initiatives. The next chapter
looks at specific case studies of CBC initiatives from the sub-Saharan region to see how
previous projects have evolved to satisfy these three sustainable development elements,
what problems they encountered, as well as establishing essential principles and criteria
deemed necessary for the sustainable viability of future projects.
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Chapter Three
Toward Successful CBC Projects: Criteria and Case Studies
3.1. DEAT's Principles and Criteria for Successful CBNRM projects
At the 2003 World Parks Congress in Durban, South Africa's Department of
Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) launched guidelines on Community-
Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) aimed at empowering rural
communities in decision-making in the use and management of natural resources
(DEAT, 2003: 1). The seven key principles put forward by DEAT are listed in Table
1:
Table 1: The Seven Key Principles Necessary for a Successful CBNRM Programme
(DEAT, 2003: 21)
Principle
A variety of different ways of earning a living needs to be maintained, to minimise
risk in case of natural and economic disasters.
The natural resource base should be maintained and even improved so that the
natural resources can continue to provide livelihoods to people now and in the
future.
Local organisations, including local government and community organisations,
must work effectively to manage local resources for the benefit of local people and
the environment.
People should receive real benefits - economic, social, cultural, and spiritual -
from managing the natural resources wisely.
There needs to be effective policies and laws that are implemented, wherever
possible, by local people's legitimate and representative organisations.
Outside assistance must be provided to facilitate local projects. Local people's
knowledge and experience is respected.
There needs to be good understanding of local leadership and local leadership fully
must support CBNRM projects.
The first principle states that people should be able to rely on various ways of earning
a living in community-based projects. Most rural households use more than one
method of making a living in order to survive. CBNRM projects must not be relied on
as an only source of income for entire communities, and must aim to add to peoples'
livelihoods as opposed to detract from them (DEAT, 2003: 23). All cultural
differences in the community must be taken into consideration to minimise potential
detrimental effects on certain groups within communities.
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According to the second principle available resources must be used in a sustainable
manner. Rules and regulations, set and enforced by the community, are necessary in
order to gain community support for the sustainable use of existing resources.
Resentment may be created if outsiders set these rules and regulations. It is also
imperative that the community is made aware of the cash value of their surrounding
resources and other benefits that conserving it on a sustainable basis might bring
(DEAT, 2003: 24).
The third principle suggests that local organisations have the ability to manage local
resources and facilitate decision-making on behalf of communities (DEAT, 2003: 29).
For successful devolution of power to occur, community conservation efforts through
CBNRM projects must be managed by a local body or organisation, responsible for
administration and making decisions. Representatives of this local body must be a
true reflection of the various social differences that occur within communities (Gibson
and Agrawal, 1999: 24). It is also essential to focus on the poorest people in the
community - they are the ones with the greatest need - by making sure the voices of
the poorest and voiceless, particularly poor women and youth, are heard (DEAT,
2003: 27). The community must also decide on whether or not traditional authorities
are represented in the CBNRM organisation. It is imperative that it is decided in a
fair, democratic and legal way, who has the rights to which areas and resources, and
what those rights and responsibilities are (DEAT, 2003: 28).
Principle four focuses on economiC, social and spiritual benefits. For economiC
benefits to be realised it is essential that income-generating projects must not be
started until the implementers ofCBNRM projects are sure of where and how they are
going to be able to market and sell their products (DEAT, 2003: 32). Benefits should
not be promised to communities without careful business analysis. Projects must also
achieve financial sustainability as soon as possible to reduce reliance on donor aid.
According to DEAT (2003: 32) it is also vital that CBNRM projects are not started
until government departments concerned are fully supportive of the project. Socio-
cultural benefits can be enhanced through the inclusion of communities in the
ownership and decision-making processes of community-based projects.
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Principle five is likely to be most effective if communities are involved in developing
policies for the organisation and the programme at an early stage of programme
development. These policies must have teeth; meaning that fines and other penalties
must get stricter when rules are broken (DEAT, 2003: 34). Policies must also be
adaptable over time. As projects develop, it may be found that some policies are not
working and require change.
The sixth principle requires looking at the community as a heterogeneous unit and
identifying all the different beliefs, hopes and needs that they might have. People who
cannot read and write must be able to participate in the CBNRM project process as
well. This can be achieved through visual aids such as maps, videos, photos and
fieldtrips (DEAT, 2003: 38). No person or group should be made to feel less
important then the other. It is important, that at all times, people within communities
are kept informed about the project, and that their views are heard. This can be
achieved through regular meetings, report-backs, workshops, in newsletters and
posters (DEAT, 2003: 46). This will go a long way to ensuring the transparency of the
project and its aims as well as gaining community trust.
Principle seven highlights the need to be aware of old and new elite capture. When
power and authority is handed over to a new group of people, such as local
councillors or officials in CBNRM projects, there is always a danger that new
leadership elites will develop (DEAT, 2003: 40). This can be avoided if rights and
duties are clearly spelled out in the constitutions of the various management bodies. It
is also useful to identify different leaders for different tasks, which helps spread the
leadership role and even out power (DEAT, 2003: 40).
3.2. Ostrom's Criteria for Successful CBNRM Projects
For comparative purposes, the design principles for long enduring common property
institutions put forward by Ostrom (1990) cited in Anstey and De Sousa (2001: 196)
are listed in Table 2:
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Table 2. Ostrom's Design principles for sustaining common property institutions:
Principle
Clearly defined boundaries
Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions or
appropriate rules for exploiting the resource and conserving it
Collective choice arrangements or the people affected by the rules must be able to
participate in changing them
Monitoring: effective monitoring procedures must be in place and monitors of
rules must be resource users or accountable to them
Graduated sanctions: resource users who violate rules will be liable to sanctions
graduated in terms of degree of the violation
Conflict resolution mechanisms: rapid access to low cost arenas to resolve
conflicts.
Minimal recognition of rights to organize: or the right of resource users to devise
their own institutions should be recognised by external (government) authorities.
It is clear that Ostrom's design principles are aimed at minimising disputes that could
derail any CBC initiative. It is therefore imperative that land rights and ownership of
the land proposed for CBC utilisation are clearly defined. Ostrom also points towards
the need for community participation in terms of having access to meeting venues, as
well as the ability of the community to be able to change rules if they prove to be too
detrimental to those who are affected by these. Nevertheless, rules that are
implemented must be respected and enforced in order for the sustainable survival of
communal land resources.
3.3.1. Nature-Based Tourism: Issues of Sustainable Development
Many CBC initiatives aim to develop and market eco-tourism ventures as a means of
income generation. The main principles behind eco-tourism are to encourage
environmental education, local development and conservation (Fennell, 2003: 7). For
marketing purposes, eco-tourism is seen by many tour operators as being
advantageous as it meets the needs of four key constituencies, namely: international
aid agencies, which see eco-tourism as a new way to bring about sustainable
development in rural communities; developing countries looking for new and less
destructive ways of earning foreign exchange; the travel industry, which has identified
a new market in socially conscious 'green tourism'; and conservation organisations
and NGOs striving for environmental protection (Thomas and Brooks, 2003: 10).
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However, conceptualising eco-tourism is a complex and often misinterpreted process.
Fennell argues that eco-tourism has been conceptualised as 'something of a pious
hope in the face of some very immediate social and economic dysfunctions' (2003: 5).
Therefore, the emergent need to develop economically, through eco-tourism, appears
to have precluded careful consideration of the where, what, why, when, and how of
eco-tourism, in the face of its utilitarian function (Fennell, 2003: 5). This has meant
that many tourist operators market themselves as being eco-tourism ventures, when in
reality they only fulfil some of the principles necessary to be truly branded as an eco-
tourism establishment. Nature-based tourism is therefore a more accurate description
of tourism that relies on attractions directly related to the natural environment. Eco-
tourism, with its stricter guidelines in terms of consumptive use of natural resources,
emphasis on educating participants on the flora, fauna and ecology of an area, as well
as the enhancement of local communities, subsequently is a sub-sector of nature-
based tourism (Fennell, 2003: 6).
The paradigm shift in conservation thinking, which emphasises the importance of
linking protected area management with the economic activities of local communities,
resulted in the growth of community-based tourism, which can be regarded as a sub-
sector of nature-based tourism and can include eco-tourism ventures. Community-
based tourism is based on the premise that tourism enterprises should not only be
environmentally sensitive, but also aim to ensure that members of local communities
have a high degree of control over the (income generating) activities taking place, and
ensure that a significant proportion of the benefits accrue back to them (Meams, 2003:
29). Meams further defines community-based tourism, setting it apart from eco-
tourism, as:
"Tourism initiatives that are owned by one or more defined communities, or
run as joint venture partnerships with the private sector with equitable
community participation, as a means of using the natural resources in a
sustainable manner to improve their standard of living in an economically
viable way" (Meams, 2003: 30).
Meams (2003) further identifies four dimensions necessary for the sustainable
development of community-based tourism. Firstly, any community-based tourism
project should be economically viable in that revenues should exceed costs. Secondly,
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projects need to be ecologically sustainable in that the environment should not reduce
in value. Thirdly, it is necessary to ensure the equitable distribution of cost and
benefits among all participants in the activity. Fourthly, ventures should have a
transparent organisation, recognised by all stakeholders as representing the interests
of community members and reflecting true ownership (Mearns, 2003: 31).
Macleod (2003:4) states that nature-based tourism has proved to offer greater
economic returns, employing about 30% more employees then pastoral agriculture
and at twice the average salary. Foggin and Munster further point out that
employment in conservation tends to be beneficial as it is sustainable since it is
unaffected by variability in agriculture production or markets for raw materials (2000:
6). A further advantage of tourism can be seen through the exchange of information
and ideas between different culture groups coming together (Green and Sibisi, 2001:
50). Improvements in local infrastructure such as roads and airstrips will also occur
due to increases in tourist ventures, subsequently providing short-term job creation
opportunities for local communities (Green and Sibisi, 2001: 51).
However, the tourist industry can also be a very fickle business that is often very
dependent on the political climate of an area. The tourist market is often subject to
fashion, one that has traditionally developed, exploited and abandoned destinations on
a relatively short-term cycle (Adams, 2001: 347). Adams subsequently argues that
despite the enthusiastic concept of eco-tourism for both long-term business
profitability and developmental benefit, the possibility of sustaining tourism in many
third world countries remains highly debatable (2001: 347).
The economIC sustainability of CBC projects could be undermined by an over-
reliance on tourism as an income-generating source. There is a risk that too much
dependence may be placed on creating markets for tourist initiatives in certain
conservation areas, causing over-saturation of the markets through increased
competition for tourist numbers that would lead to decreased profits for community
initiatives, and thus reduce the incentives to conserve wild land areas. Hulme and
Murphree (2001) point out that many ventures have focused on the supply side and
relatively limited attention has been paid to developing demand. If economic returns
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are to be increased, then serious market research and new product development will
be needed (Hulme and Murphree, 2001: 287).
An alternative to eco-tourism for income generation and economic sustainability of
projects is the often-controversial 'consumptive use' of biological resources, meaning
the sustainable harvesting of wildlife and plants (Adams, 2001: 347). This can take
several forms, such as the hunting by local people on a subsistence level for bush
meat, killing in return for commercial hunters' licence fees, or through the collection
of marketable or consumable natural products, for example ostrich eggs. This
approach fits in with the earlier mentioned dictum of use it in a sustainable way and
gain economic returns for it or lose it all together. The consumptive use of wildlife is
heavily reliant on the feasibility with which a 'sustainable harvest' can be defined
(often involving complex scientific tasks involving lots of data collection and
monitoring) (Adams, 2001: 347). This process also requires strong institutional forces
(rules and regulations) to ensure that harvests of wildlife stock are done in a
controlled and ethical manner.
3.3.2. Benefit Distribution: The Free-Rider Concept.
According to Hulme and Murphree (2001: 281), research indicates that shifts to
community conservation have generally been beneficial in aggregate terms for
communities, relative to pre-existing regimes of fortress conservation. Improvements
in local job creation, access to resources and upgraded social infrastructures tend to be
the net social and economic benefits of CBC initiatives in return for preserving some
communal lands for conservation purposes. It must be noted that except for rare cases,
the additional flows of income and resources are at a scale of magnitude that means
that, at best, they are a welcome increment to the livelihoods of the poor (Hulme and
Murphree, 2001: 289). It is therefore fundamental for community conservation
programmes not to detract from peoples' alternative means of making livelihoods, as
emphasised by the sustainable livelihood approach (Figure 2, Chapter Two). Two
important ways of ensuring this, as has been mentioned, are by ensuring that
economic benefits accrue back to the local community that exceed the costs incurred,
and by including representatives from all segments of the community in the planning
and managing of projects to ensure that no specific group within a community is
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disadvantaged. However, several case studies have illustrated that trying to instigate
both these important principles, as well as those of the sustainable development
premise, has created unforeseen problems for certain CBC projects.
It has been found, for example, that benefit-based incentives designed to induce
conservation practices, such as improvements in schools and health services, can
often lead to the free-rider phenomenon. For example, in Zambia the Administrative
Management Design for Game Management Areas (ADMADE) in the Luangwa
Valley National Park, a community project designed to conserve wildlife based upon
the sustainable cull/profit taking of wild animals with the proceeds of these harvests
shared with local residents, found that:
"By glvmg quasi-public goods to commumtles to abstain from hunting,
programs fail to reward individuals' behaviour. Consequently, programs create
a free-rider problem in which individuals continue to hunt while receiving the
benefits of community-level projects" (Gibson and Marking, 1995: 942).
To avoid the free-rider effect and ensure that conservation policies work more
efficiently, more individuals from local communities need to receive sufficient
benefits to change their behaviour from taking wildlife to conserving it. Gibson and
Marking reiterate that three broad benefits need to occur to induce this change:
"Firstly, there needs to be a direct link to wildlife such as jobs as scouts, wage
earners in the tourist industry and meat from culling. Secondly, indirect links
to wildlife that consist of the standard goods dispensed by development
projects such as schools and health clinics need to be encouraged. Finally,
empowerment of rural residents through local participation in decision making
needs to occur" (1995: 944).
Solutions to illegal hunting in new game reserves, such as the Usuthu Gorge and
Mabaso community game reserves in South Africa's KwaZulu-Natal province, need
to be introduced at the planning stage. Economic benefits would need to accrue
relatively quickly back to the local communities to convince them of the merits of
conservation. If illegal hunting persists, then it is inevitable that a hybridisation of
fortress conservation and community conservation techniques will have to occur to
ensure that development and conservation goals are met.
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Leach, Meams and Scoones highlight three reasons why community conservation
projects have often fallen short of expectations in the past:
"Due to a tendency for the intended beneficiaries to be treated as passive
recipients of project activities. There is also a tendency for projects to be too
short-term in nature and over reliant on expatriate expertise. Often clear
criteria by which to judge sustainability or success in meeting conservation or
development goals are absent" (1999: 227).
This emphasises the need for community involvement in decision-making, as well as
the importance of training locals to take over managerial positions in order to reduce
the reliance on expatriate knowledge. This cannot be achieved in the short-term and
requires realistic long-term time frames to ensure the success and sustainability of
community conservation projects.
3.3.3. Devolution: Local Municipality Versus Tribal Authority
Devolving decision making to the community level, aimed at empowenng
communities and enhancing the social element of the sustainable development model,
is often a complex process that can lead to detrimental results ifnot handled properly.
Authority over Zimbabwe's Communal Areas Management Programme for
Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) went from the Department of National Parks and
Wildlife Management (DNPWLM) at the national level to Rural District Councils
(RDC's) (Jones and Murphree, 2001: 45). Although decisions were devolved to a
district level the decision making lay in the hands of a small group of elite who
appropriated the bulk of the revenues generated by their producer communities and
failed to meet project objectives that would benefit the wider community (Jones and
Murphree, 2001: 49). This undermines the CBC principle, which stipulates that local
organisations, including local government and community organisations, must work
effectively together in order to manage local resources for the benefit of local people
and the environment (DEAT, 2003: 21).
In order to avoid local level government bureaucracy, it has been suggested that local
communities retain the revenues they create in trust funds and determine how to
distribute the income through elected community councils or tribal authority
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structures (Venter, 200: 4). The problem with using traditional structures is that
African 'indigenous institutions' show inconsistent levels of democracy. Such
institutions are democratic in so far as traditional authorities consult their subjects
whenever critical decisions are taken (Ntsebeza, 2003: 80). However, indigenous
institutions are based on ascribed, hereditary rule. Rural residents do not have the
freedom to choose which institutions and individuals should rule them thus the overall
tribal authority process is essentially undemocratic in nature (Ntsebeza, 2003: 80).
The devolution process from RDCs to tribal authorities would involve transferring
authority to the community, which is often an unpopular move amongst local
government officials as it means that they lose out on authority and potential direct
revenues for their departments. For this reason, it is often hard to negotiate complete
devolution to community councils. Tensions between chiefs or tribal authorities and
the broader community may also arise, as chiefs will be scared of devolving too much
of their own decision-making powers to elected community councils.
Anstey and De Sousa point out that in Mozambique there is a 'crisis of authority and
within this crisis government administration and traditional structures function in an
uneasy and complex set of compromises' (2001, 199). Local authorities tend to be
secular in outlook, whereas traditional authorities, such as chiefs, often have a
historically sacred and spiritual role to play within communities, which gives them
prestige amongst local residents and is an added reason why they should be brought
on side to ensure the success of community conservation projects. However, a study
carried out in Mozambique's Chimanimani district demonstrated that traditional
institutions can evolve more complex institutional arrangements for the management
of scarce natural resources, which are far more robust, efficient, equitable and
requiring lower inputs than those preferred and introduced by formal programmes of
the state, donors and NGOs (Anstey and De Sousa, 2001: 205).
Nevertheless tribal authorities tend to be very autocratic and undemocratic in nature,
which means certain provisions have to be put in place (see Chapter Five) to make
tribal authorities more democratic and gender equitable in nature. The strengths and
weaknesses of the various competing institutional structures must be understood if
community conservation programmes are to achieve maximum benefit from the
various role players. One way of achieving effective participation of competing
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authority figures is to have representatives from both the tribal authorities and local
municipalities sit on community conservation project steering committees.
The debate over devolution of power between tribal authorities and local
municipalities, in rural areas where most CBC initiatives are located, is an interesting
and contentious issue in South Africa. In keeping with the democratic principles
within the constitution, the post-1994 state aims to establish new democratic and
accountable structures at a local level, with significant community participation, for
land administration and management (Ntsebeza, 2003: 56). The new constitution
requires that municipalities, consisting of elected representatives, be established in the
whole of South Africa, including areas of the former Bantustans, which would go a
long way to diminishing the power and authority held by tribal authorities throughout
South Africa. The reason for the amount of power tribal authorities enjoy in South
Africa is a legacy of the former apartheid regime, which exacerbated and enhanced
the power base of pre-existing tribal authorities. During the apartheid era, the
government owned communal land and used tribal authority structures to administer
local government and development activities in these areas. As a result, rural residents
were largely excluded from the administration and management of the land, which
was controlled by the tribal authorities, dominated by hereditary traditional authorities
that often became highly dictatorial and tyrannical (Ntsebeza, 2003: 57). The ANC
and other political parties are trying to redress these undemocratic injustices of the
past by increasing the powers of local municipalities. This political debate over tribal
authorities and local municipalities has had unforeseen impacts on CBC initiatives in
South Africa's KwaZulu-Natal Province, where support for tribal authorities IS
relatively strong, as illustrated by the Mabaso Case Study (Chapter Five).
3.3.4. Community Participation and Elite Capture
Complete devolution to the community does not always solve the problem of elite
capture, which is the inequitable distribution of profits and benefits to an elite group.
ADMADE in Zambia, in trying to determine the most equitable way of distributing
benefits, chose local chiefs to chair wildlife management sub-authorities in an attempt
to 'reinvest chiefs with some of their former symbolic functions' (Gibson and
Marking, 1995: 946). Unfortunately, chiefs tended to act with nepotism and out of
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self-interest in the sense that development projects coincidentally were often situated
in and around chiefdoms (Gibson and Marking, 1995: 946). Such inequitable
practices within communities, namely nepotism and elite capture, go a long way to
diminishing, as opposed to enhancing, the socio-cultural element of the sustainable
development model.
Hulme and Murphree point out that to avoid such elite capture concerted attempts to
use participatory procedures, by having representatives selected through electoral
processes, and the delivery of benefits in a transparent often indivisible form (schools,
health centres and village water supplies) that are spread fairly in terms of
geographical location, need to occur (2001: 289). Transparency is crucial in gaining
the trust and support of proj ects from local communities and can be enhanced through
regular meetings with community members to inform them on income spending plans
and project progress.
A case study of the Mavhulani Bush Camp Project, ajoint venture agreement between
the local community and a private investor in South Africa's Mpumulanga Province
on the edge of the Kruger National Park, showed that certain employment procedures
can be implemented to avoid nepotism and elite capture (Viljoen and Naicker, 2000:
143). Firstly, any prospective employee for the Mavhulani Bush camp has to come
from the local community. Secondly, the employment of members of the same family,
such as husbands or wives, is not allowed so as to prevent two or more incomes from
the initiatives going to the same family. Thirdly, in an attempt to avoid nepotism,
interviews are only ever carried out on a first name basis in order to prevent the status
of the individual in the local community from becoming known and averting
accusations of biasing the decision to employ a person (Viljoen and Naicker, 2000:
143). A positive effect of reducing nepotism in this way is that employment is spread
more equitably.
3.3.5. The Private Sector and Community-Based Conservation
The private sector provides essential investments in many CBC projects such as
tourist lodge infrastructure, marketing and skills training, due to the fact that it is often
hard for unskilled community members to gain access to formal credit structures. In
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return for private investment, communities offer their locations for development as
well as abundant pools of relatively cheap labour. Despite the potential benefits that
the private sector offers, it is imperative that the community tries to equalise its power
base in order to negotiate more beneficial terms for themselves. The Kunene Region
in Northern Namibia offers several case study examples of various different, often
contradictory, methods that communities have used to negotiate with the private
sector with various levels of success.
A lot of private sector concessionaires in the Kunene Region lease land directly from
the government, and therefore do not have a legal responsibility to local communities.
However, several private tourist initiatives have entered into relationships with the
communities, mainly through 'enlightened self-interest' (Jones, 2001: 172). One such
example is the Etendeka Mountain Camp in Damaraland that added an extra bed levy
that was paid back into the community. It was found that the decision on levy money
investment should be determined purely by the local communities and not influenced
by the private firm (Jones, 2001: 172). This was expected to produce an improved
working relationship between private sector and the community. In practice decisions
on investment are still very much down to the goodwill and enlightenment of the
private firm and the community has no real negotiating power (Jones, 2001: 174).
A slightly different relationship occurs at the Kunene region's Damaraland Camp,
which is a joint venture between the local community of the area and a private safari
company. In this case the community has a type of lease from government on the land
on which the lodge is situated. This lease strengthens the community's position in its
negotiations with the company and establishes a more equal partnership (Jones, 2001:
172). The community's position was strengthened further with the help from a local
NGO called Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation (IRDNC), a
public interest legal firm that employs some government resource economists. The
latter helped negotiate a deal with the private company, which includes managerial
level training for community members and an option for the community to take over
the full running of the camp after a certain period with a guarantee by the company to
maintain the supply of tourists to the camp (lones, 2001: 172). This increase in
negotiating power is a crucial tool to enhancing the social and economic elements of
the sustainable development model.
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This same community has taken over another site in the area and subsequently turned
down a new investor not prepared to meet the same standards as set by the
Damaraland camp (Jones, 2001: 173). This emphasises the amount of benefits a
community can gain out of potential investors if the community is instilled with
enough negotiating power. The greater investment a community can negotiate from a
private investor, the more likely a CBC project will work, as more benefits will accrue
back to the community if implementation is successful, subsequently gaining their full
support for the project. Direct community leases over the land means that the
community consequently owns an asset that the private sector wants and is prepared
to negotiate for. As Jones points out, communities will be able to gain maximum
financial returns through competitive bidding for their concessions and will need the
continued support ofNGOs and governments to play an advisory role in ensuring that
they have enough information and understanding of business practices to negotiate
with confidence (2001: 173).
The process must work both ways, and communities must therefore be able to offer
the private sector something worthwhile, otherwise no investment will be attracted
into CBC areas. The scenic beauty of many communal rural areas is a major draw-
card for private investors, but communities must ensure the survival of these areas by
sustaining their high non-use values, in return for economic and social benefits
accruing from eco-tourism initiatives. If the biodiversity of these communal CBC
areas are degraded in any way by community practices, then private investors will
simply pull out. These community/ private partnerships therefore rely on a clear
commitment from the community to compromise on various land uses that may be
detrimental to the economic non-use value of an area.
In order to help market and attract potential investors in Namibia, community-based
tourism enterprises combined to form their own NGO, known as the Namibian
Community-Based Tourism Association (NACOBTA), which helped open up
dialogue with private sector tourism organisations to provide information about CBC
initiatives and promote community friendly approaches (Jones, 2001: 173). This
helped in reducing the duplication of marketing efforts by CBC initiatives and in
spreading awareness by representing all the CBC projects under one umbrella.
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According to Viljoen and Naicker (2000: 142) it is imperative that any agreements
made between private investors and local communities should not raise expectations
of local communities or lead to unsustainable practices aimed at generating quick
incomes. A study at the Mukuya Park in South Africa showed that the managers of
the reserve wanted to generate quick incomes through hunting. The short-term gain
from hunting proved to be unsustainable, as the park could not support this activity,
and all the community received as a result of the effort was 'a few hundred Rand and
about a hundred kilograms of meat' (Viljoen and Naicker, 2000: 143).
3.3.6. Long-term Sustainability of CBC initiatives
Kenya's Amboseli National Park, which was declared a conservation area in 1974,
has been cited in the past as a good example of where conservation initiatives have
led to positive developmental outcomes during the mid to late 1970s. As a result of
tourism initiatives and park outreach schemes, a school and a cattle dip were built,
wood and gravel were sold to the park by the local communities and campsite fees
were regularly being paid (Adams, 2001: 344). Unfortunately, during the 1980s this
seemingly efficient system deteriorated for a number of reasons.
Amboseli is located in an area that is grazed by the Masai cattle in the dry season,
with cattle making up to 60% of the large animal biomass (Lindsey, 1987 in Adams,
2001: 344). When Amboseli was declared a national park, a series of agreements were
made between the Masai and the government, which meant that the Masai gave up the
right to graze in the new reserve in return for joint ownership of surrounding land in
group ranches, piped water supplies, compensation for lost production through
wildlife grazing, economic opportunities in the form of tourist lodges, and
developments such as a school and dispensary (Adams, 2001: 344). The whole
process was undermined due to the fact that the borehole and pipeline systems never
became fully functional due to the government's lack of capacity to carry out its
promises. After 1981 wildlife utilisation fees began to be paid irregularly. The fees
that were paid were retained by the treasury (Adams, 2001: 344). Promises were made
in the beginning that subsequently raised community expectations only for them to be
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quashed when the project objectives failed in the long-term. Adams sums up the
situation in the following way:
"The Amboseli Park Plan, like previous programmes, failed to provide the
Masai community with continuous appreciable benefit in return for
compromises in their use of land. Income to the Masai was too little and too
unpredictable and continuing cultural, social and economic change among the
Masai undermined static assumptions about the long-term acceptability and
sustainability of the group ranching system" (2001: 344).
As such, poaching of large game animals such as rhino and elephant started to
become a common occurrence within the actual national park. This emphasises the
long-term commitment necessary to ensuring that the community continually benefits
from reserves in order to sustain their long-term support for such conservation
initiatives.
Long-term time frames need to be put in place by skilled professionals and donor
funders involved in CBC initiatives due to the fact that community projects in remote
areas take a longer than usual amount of time and energy to implement. One of the
reasons CBC projects take so long to implement is because every basic need, from
infrastructure to skills development, needs to be implemented from scratch. Funding
organisations that demand quick short-term results undermine the process that in
reality requires a lot of patience and perseverance. This long-term time frame required
contradicts, in the short term, the identified necessity to ensure that local communities
own and run their own project. The aim of the donors and funders, therefore, should
be to build capacity amongst the local community, through training schemes and
providing guidance and technical advice, in order to ensure that the local community
are able to eventually take over the project and run it in a sustainable manner. In the
interim period, the donors, funders and other stakeholders should make every effort to
include and incorporate the local community and their ideas in the implementation
phase.
The East Usambaras Agricultural Development and Environmental Conservation
Project in Tanzania exemplifies further problems with regards to trying to achieve too
much too quickly and not focusing enough resources into specific areas over a long
enough time frame. This project, funded by the International Union for the
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Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (ruCN) began in 1987 with the joint
aims being to improve the living standards of the people; to protect the functions of
the forest in the area; and to preserve the biodiversity of the region (Adams, 2001:
345). Emphasis was put on revenue generation and development through a wide range
of initiatives from agriculture extensions to attempts to control illegal pit sawing, with
little progress being made after four years of implementation (Adams, 2001: 345).
Adams cites several reasons for the project failing:
"The problems of the East Usambaras Project included lack of funds, leading
in turn to a lack of breadth in technical expertise, and the way in which capital
and energy were dissipated in too wide a range of activities. Behind many of
these problems lay a lack of feasibility study, a common failing in
conservation projects" (2001: 346).
The lessons learnt from the Usambaras project in the initial stages, was the necessity
to have a high level of skills on the part of the project implementation staff, which in
many CBC initiatives tends to involve an advisory and/or funding NGO, in order to
ensure the continuation of the project in the long-term. The Usambaras case study
emphasises the need to focus on a few initiatives at a time within a project in order
not to overstretch the resource and skills base of any scheme. In order for skilled staff
members to be able to see the implementation of CBC projects through to fruition,
substantial funds are needed in line with realistic long-term time frames. Adams
(2001: 345) points out that:
"Clear and precise objectives, careful evaluation of the costs and benefits of
project components at the level of the individual household, long-term
commitment to funding, and strong local participatory linkages are essential.
Projects of this sort will not be cheap to implement, and will not yield results
quickly. Furthermore, there is a real risk that positive impacts of the project on
the local economy will be transient and dependent on the maintenance of
flows of project revenues."
This is not to say that the eventual aim of any CBC project is to remain reliant on
donor funding and outside technical aid to ensure the long-term continual flow of
benefits back to the community. All CBC initiatives must aim to eventually become
fully community owned and self-sufficient. For this reason, deadlines must be set to
ensure that this happens; otherwise the process and continual dependence on outsiders
will continue indefinitely, which is unsustainable and not the intention of the CBC
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concept. Processes must be set in place, during the implementation phase of any
project, to train local community members and build their capacities in order for them
to become less reliant on outside professionals for advice and financial assistance.
Skilled professionals, funding organisations and NGOs involved with CBC initiatives
must therefore all work towards ensuring that projects are sustainable when they
inevitably withdraw.
3.3.7. Competing Social Development Choices in Conservation Areas
Project planners need to be aware of the potential long-term impacts of social
development in and around conservation areas. According to Murombedzi (1999:
290), local communities in several CAMPFIRE areas in Zimbabwe, despite
CAMPFIRE benefits per household being highest where human population densities
were low, actively encouraged in-migration settlement so that the community could
quickly constitute a large enough constituency to leverage development (i.e. schools
and roads) from the government. Wildlife was therefore seen as an asset that could be
expended in order to subsidise long-term development and make way for agriculture
and livestock. The latter was a more popular activity as evidenced by the preference
given to redirecting revenues, at the community's request, from wildlife assets into
agricultural schemes (Murombedzi, 1999: 292). Murombedzi stipulates that a likely
reason for the apparent lack of interest in the long-term survival of conservation
principles is that average wildlife incomes were insufficient to constitute a source of
capital accumulation for most CAMPFIRE households (1999: 293). It could be argued
that CAMPFIRE may have recognised more conservation benefits had the
communities involved gained more devolved rights instead of the RDC's that created
bureaucratic bottle-necks preventing communities from receiving their full fair share
of the benefits. If the communities had received their fair share of the benefits, then




Four broad objectives helped fonnulate the research questions that produced the
findings within this study. The first objective aimed at describing the two main case
study examples, namely the MCGR and the UGCCA. Questions that helped fonnulate
this objective were: What was the history of the CBC project? Who were the main
players responsible for setting up the initiatives? What is the current status of the
project? What resources were needed for the projects to become a reality? Who
needed to be approached and consulted in order for the initiatives to become a reality?
The second objective aimed at detennining what these identified key role players
perceived to be the most relevant issues and criteria for the successful implementation
of CBC initiatives. The third objective set out to establish whether necessary criteria
identified from other sources of infonnation were included in the implementation of
the two case study initiatives. For example, out of the criteria for successful
implementation of CBC initiatives listed by DEAT (DEAT, 2003 :21) and Ostrom
(Anstey and De Sousa, 1990: 196), which criteria were present or absent from the
case study examples? Sub-questions related to this objective were used to detennine
what the quality of communication between stakeholders was like; whether different
livelihood strategies were being maintained and encouraged and to detennine whether
effective institutions, policies and laws were being implemented by local people's
legitimate and representative organisations. The fourth objective of the study was to
detennine what the effect of including or excluding some of the identified criteria
would be. Subsequently, the broader research question for this objective was how do
various criteria affect the social, economic and biological elements of the CBC
project? These four objectives and the subsequent related questions provided a
framework around which this study was conducted in order to detennine what criteria
are needed to implement a successful CBC project.
This chapter has introduced vanous case study examples of CBC projects from
around Africa and illustrated certain problems that the different projects have
encountered, such as various types of elite capture, devolution of authority to the
wrong levels and the positive and negative aspects of incorporating traditional
structures into CBC initiatives. The chapter has also identified criteria deemed
necessary for the sustainable implementation and running of CBC projects (Tables 1
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and 2), which form the conceptual basis for answering questions on what criteria are
needed for successful implementation of CBC programmes. The seven key principles
put forward by DEAT and Ostrom respectively go a long way to guiding the
enhancement of both the sustainable development model and the sustainable
livelihood approach model, by enhancing the role local communities play in the
implementation of CBC projects. These principles and criteria are used to assess and
assist in the development of formal community institutions to manage common
property resources in a sustainable fashion, and are used as a basis for identifying the
pre-requisites for the effective management and implementation of institutions
necessary for sustaining community conservation projects. The ideas and arguments
formed in the previous chapter and this chapter have not only helped form the
research questions for this study, but have helped direct the nature and scope of the
primary research described and discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter Four
Methodology and Case Study Over-View
4.1. Case Studies: Advantages and Disadvantages
The case study strategy is the most appropriate research strategy to analyse the
complexities and contradictions relating to the sustainable development model on
which many CBC projects are based. Case studies provide an in-depth understanding
of complex phenomena such as identifying conflicting perceptions, views and
opinions of the various stakeholders trying to put into practise specific CBC
initiatives. An analysis of cases also allows us to establish what problems and
successes have been encountered in different contexts. These profiles also aim to
determine what ways the different stakeholders are working together towards
enhancing the three elements in the sustainable development model (Figure 1).
Case studies are beneficial as they serve exploratory, descriptive and explanatory
purposes that help generate theory and initiate change (Blaike, 2000: 213). In case
studies the researcher explores a single entity or phenomenon (the case) bounded by
time and activity (a program, event, process, institution, or social group) and collects
detailed information by using a variety of data collection procedures, mainly
qualitative techniques, such as intensive interviews, questionnaires, self-histories,
documents, case reports and letters during a sustained period of time (Creswell, 1994:
12, in Blaikie, 2000: 216). Case study data collection can also rely on participant
observation, where the investigator takes on a role other than that of a passive
observer and participates in the events being studied (Robson, 1993: 159). Robson
(1993: 163) identifies several general skills required by case study investigators.
Firstly, good question asking skills are needed to enquire why events appear to have
happened or to be happening. Secondly, good listening is essential to take in a lot of
new information without bias; noting the exact words said and appreciating content.
Thirdly, adaptiveness and flexibility are required in order to be willing to change
plans if the unanticipated occurs. Fourthly, a lack of bias is important to avoid
substantiating a preconceived position. The investigator must therefore be open to
alternative findings and be prepared to acknowledge them in an objective manner.
47
Criticisms of case studies in general include a concern with biased findings being
presented as a consequence of the researcher influencing the results due to a lack of
replication (Blaikie, 2000: 218). There is also an argument that case studies do not
give a good generalisation of the overall picture, as each case tends to have too many
unique aspects, and if several cases are used it is difficult to establish their
comparability (Blaikie, 2000: 218). Case studies can also produce unmanageable
amounts of data. The quality of a case study is also dependent to a large extent on the
competence of the investigator. A case study is not a 'soft' option in terms of
analytical skills and knowledge of procedure, due to the fact that there are no fast
routine procedures that simply involve following a formula (Robson, 1993: 162).
4.2. The Process of Identifying Case Studies for the Research Project
Having decided on the CBC research focus, the researcher approached KZN Tourism
to determine their involvement with community conservation initiatives. Mrs Fathima
Kolia, a research manager at KZN Tourism, indicated that there were several projects
which KZN Tourism were involved in, that would be relevant and available for
research. These projects included the Ngome Community Game Reserve and a
community tourism initiative at the Lilani Hot Springs. Unfortunately, shortly after
approaching KZN Tourism, the Ngome project was put on hold due to divisions
within the community. The Lilani Hot Springs project was rejected as a suitable case
because the project was not sufficiently advanced to contribute to the measurement of
the effects of longer-term implementation.
Mrs Kolia suggested getting in touch with an NGO called the Wildlands Trust who
are involved with CBC initiatives and who work closely with KZN Tourism. The
Wildlands Trust was established in 1989 and was the brainchild of a number of
significant conservation leaders, including Mr N. Steele and Dr 1. Player (Peace Parks
Foundation, 2002: 1). The Trust was established as a direct result of the increasing
pressure being put on the environment in KZN by rapidly growing rural communities
needing land and natural resources.
The Wildlands Trust's VISIOn is the re-establishment of the connections between
islands of relatively unspoiled biodiversity, allowing the free migration of wildlife and
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the restoration of vibrant and viable ecosystems throughout the region (Peace Parks
Foundation, 2002: 2). The approach and philosophy that the Trust uses to achieve this
aim is through the need to balance their vision with the needs of the people living in
and around these corridors and islands. Subsequently, the Trust has adopted a
sustainable development approach that is guided by the Trust's conservation SPACE
program, 'where SPACE is an anagram for Species, People, And the Conservation of
the Environment' (Peace Parks Foundation, 2003: 2). SPACE recognises and includes
the needs of rural poor people in conservation planning and management, thus
incorporating the new conservation concept of community-based conservation into its
philosophy.
The Wildlands Trust works closely with several partners to help achieve its goals,
including KZN Wildlife, AMAFA (provincial cultural heritage agency), KZN
Tourism, Greater St Lucia Wetland Park Authority (GSLWP), Wilderness
Foundation, World Wide Fund for Nature (SA), Peace Park Foundation and Bird Life
(SA). The Wildlands Trust has set itself the task of raising funds from the private
sector for conservation. Donors for the Trust include AVIS, British Trust for
Conservation Volunteers, DaimlerChrysler, Ford Foundation, Global Nature Fund,
INVESTEC, Kathleen Hastie Trust, Lufthansa, NEDCOR, Richards Bay Coal
Terminal, SAPPI, South African Breweries, UNILEVER, US Fish and Wildlife and
the Victor Daitz Foundation (CCF, 2004: 2). The variety of these donors perhaps
reflects the increase in corporate responsibility for important issues such as nature
conservation and poverty alleviation.
Dr Andrew Venter, the present CEO of the Wildlands Trust, was extremely
approachable and helpful in relation to suggesting research topics and potential case
study areas for analysis. It was decided that two of the projects that the Wildlands
Trust is currently involved with, the Usuthu Gorge Community Conservation Area
(UGCCA) and the Mabaso Community Game Reserve (MCGR), might be appropriate
cases. A critical characteristic making these cases relevant is that the projects are
both relatively mature in terms of their implementation processes. This maturity
provides a more holistic picture of the challenges and successes faced throughout the
stages of setting up and implementing a CBC project. Gaining access to case research
sites is one of the potential problems of case study research. For this project the
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Wildlands Trust was prepared to provide all the necessary contact details for
interviews at both project sites. Without the Wildlands Trust's influence, it would
have been nearly impossible to gather all the necessary information. According to
Robson (1993: 161) the experiences of a second case study analysis may build upon
the first case study, perhaps carrying the investigation into an area suggested by the
first study; or the second study area may complement the first by focusing on an area
not originally covered. The cases selected for this research project are similar in
purpose - community based conservation - and it may be possible to achieve
'analytical generalisation' through researching more than one case.
4.3.1. Data Collection
One of the characteristics of a case study is that the researcher is likely to use various
sources of information as well as using multiple methods to collect information. For
this study, information was collected from documents, observations and interviews.
4.3.2. Documents
Literature - including material from published books, journals, newspaper articles, the
Internet, magazine articles, and working papers for various conferences - was used to
understand key concepts in the field of sustainable development and community-
based conservation, to develop a theoretical framework and identify examples of CBC
projects and characteristics of their implementation.
An initial use of documents, such as the Mabaso and Usuthu project reports,
committee meeting minutes and Wildland Trust reports were used to gather
background information on the Wildlands Trust and the CBC cases to provide a
contextual framework. In addition, maps, photographs, census data, government
reports and annual reports of the workings of CBC initiatives were used as sources of
information. Further into the study the researcher used minutes from committee
meetings to identify activities taking place within the research sites as well as measure
composition of participating groups and the relationships between role players.
Interview schedules were developed from early data gathering and observation.
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4.3.3. Observation
Observations were widely used to establish what was going on in the research sites
and to observe communication between various CBC stakeholders at meetings. Dr
Andrew Venter facilitated an introductory fieldtrip to the study areas on the 26th to the
27th of January 2004. This was a crucial reconnaissance trip to conduct field
observations and gain invaluable knowledge about the histories, locations and context
of both the Mabaso and Usuthu Game Reserves. The excursion offered the chance to
arrange interviews with key individuals involved with the implementation of both
projects. During the field trip the researcher attended the Mabaso Steering Committee
meeting held at the Mabaso Tribal Court on the 2ih of January 2004. This represented
an important opportunity, as the researcher was able to observe and record
communication between the Tribal Authority and the Mabaso Community Game
Reserve Steering Committee. The researcher was also able to view minutes taken
from previous meetings. The field observations and participation in community
meetings proved to be an enlightening experience for this author. The researcher was
able to observe various attributes relevant to assessing the status of the CBC projects,
such as damaged fences at Mabaso, the progress made with the first eco-friendly
tourist accommodation facility on the shores of Lake Sibaya (see Chapter Five) and
the windmill and cattle troughs placed outside the Usuthu Gorge Reserve fence (see
Chapter Six). Unfortunately the researcher missed a vital opportunity to record some
of these observations on film. The camera equipment failed on this reconnaissance
trip, and the researcher did not gain access to the same areas on later visits because
the focus of study shifted to interviewing key informants and the researcher did not
have a 4x4 vehicle needed to revisit the areas.
4.3.4. Interviews
One of the objectives of this research project is to find out what key stakeholders view
as important for the success of a CBC project. To achieve this objective it was
necessary to interview various stakeholders from NGOs and the community structures
involved. To add to the knowledge already gained from the reconnaissance trip about
the range of different expert perceptions, as well as an in-depth history of both the
projects, semi-structured interviews were carried out with members of the involved
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communities and representatives from both KZN Wildlife and the Wildlands Trust.
The interviews were semi-structured and included questions contingent on the area of
expertise of the person being interviewed. All respondents were briefed on the
purpose of the study and agreed to their responses and quotes being used in this thesis.
A semi-structured interview style was chosen with the benefit of such methodology
being 'that the interviewed subject's viewpoints are more likely to be expressed in a
relatively openly designed interview situation than in a standardised interview' (Flick,
1998: 76). Semi-structured interviews are also deemed appropriate because they
provide the opportunity for the interviewer to respond to information given and obtain
a more accurate and complete picture relatively quickly.
Interviews were arranged with Dr Andrew Venter and Sue McClintock from the
Wildlands Trust. Mr Watson Nxumalo, from the Mabaso steering committee, Mr
Frey, the community officer at Usuthu, and Mr Mandla Tembe the KZN Wildlife
representative for the UGCCA. Interviews were conducted at the various research
sites. Permission was obtained to quote material from interviews. For purposes of
anonymity and confidentiality each respondents' identity has been coded for analysis.
The observations and notes from the Mabaso Steering committee meeting have also
been included in the coding system. Citations and quotes from interviews and the
committee meeting attended by the author are recorded as CC1, CC2, CC3, CC4 and
CCF in the text.
Unfortunately, due to a lack of time and ease of access, the author was unable to gain
interviews with donor agencies and the private investors involved in both projects,
which would have provided a more holistic view of the challenges faced in
implementing a CBC initiative.
4.4. Analysis
The process of data analysis chosen was an ad hoc use of different approaches and
techniques for meaning generation. Miles and Huberman (1994) cited in Kvale (1996:
204) identified thirteen such tactics for generating meaning that are arranged roughly
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from the descriptive to the explanatory, and from the concrete to the more conceptual
and abstract:
"Noting patterns, themes (1), seeing plausibility (2), and clustering (3) help the
analyst see "what goes with what." Making metaphors (4), like the preceding
three tactics, is a way to achieve more integration among diverse pieces of
data. Counting (5) is also familiar way to see "what's there." Making
contrasts-comparisons (6) is a pervasive tactic that sharpens understanding.
Differentiation sometimes is needed, too, as in partitioning variables (7). We
also need tactics for seeing things and their relationships more abstractly.
These include subsuming particulars under the general (8); factoring (9), an
analogue to a familiar quantitative technique; noting relations between
variables (10); and finding intervening variables (11). Finally, how can we
systematically assemble a coherent understandable set of data? The tactics
discussed are building a logical chain of evidence (12) and making conceptual/
theoretical coherence (B)" (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 245-246).
Whilst incorporating some of the above techniques, data analysis for this thesis tended
to be more of a hybridisation of narrative structuring and meaning categorisation.
Narrative structuring entails:
"The temporal and social organisation of a text to bring out its meaning. It
focuses on the stories told during an interview and works out their structures
and their plots. If there are no stories told spontaneously, a narrative analysis
may attempt to create a coherent story out of the many happenings reported
through out an interview" (Kvale, 1996: 192).
Meaning categorisation was used to reduce, organise and structure the large interview
texts into specific categories that were largely based around the identified set criteria
deemed necessary for successful CBC implementation discussed in Chapter Two.
4.5. Overview of the Case Study Region
Two community projects serve as cases for this study. Both the Mabaso and Usuthu
Gorge Community Game Reserves are situated in Maputaland, South Africa (Figure
8, Appendix A). Maputaland is located in the remote northern parts of South Africa's
KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) province (Figure 9, Appendix A). According to Foggin and
Munster (2000: 4), the scenic quality, diversity of wildlife resources and cultural and
historical heritage of KZN, provide the province with an important comparative
advantage that could be enhanced and further utilised through nature-based tourism
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ventures to help stimulate rural livelihood strategies III remote communal areas
through CBC projects. As such, KZN lends itself to the possibility of introducing
sustainable community conservation projects as a strategy to providing poor
households with alternative incomes and livelihoods, in order to help alleviate poverty
while enhancing and protecting the biodiversity of the region.
The people of KZN are amongst the poorest in the country with an income per capita
that lies 25% below the national average. Compared to other regions of South Africa,
KZN has a medium Human Development Index characterised by a poorly skilled
labour force, as well as high unemployment levels in rural areas (Foggin and Munster,
2000: 3). The livelihood strategies in the rural areas of KZN tend to be limited, and
most of the population is dependent on subsistence agriculture (Elliot, 1996: 10). The
Mathenjwa Tribe, which is the community that lives in and around the Usuthu Gorge
Community Conservation Area (UGCCA), exemplifies this as the Peace Parks
Foundation (2002: 7) points out:
"According to the available census data there are 88 households in the
Mathenjwa Traditional Area with a population of approximately 546 people.
The estimated average annual household income is $400. The main sources of
energy and light in this area are paraffin and candles. There is no locally
available electricity. There are no flush toilets, and only some pit latrines"
(2002: 7).
The UGCCA, if implemented and run properly, could go some way to help alleviate
the poverty that exists in the Mathenjwa Tribal area by aiming to fulfil the sustainable
development premise through the enhancement of the model's economic, social and
biological goals.
The Mabaso Community Game Reserve (MCGR) and UGCCA are working examples
of community conservation projects in progress. The projects share some
characterisitics. Both projects are joint initiatives between the local community tribal
authorities who have tenure over the land, Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, and the
Wildlands Trust (Bishop, 2003: 1). The stakeholders of both cases aim to create
community-owned nature-based tourism ventures. As poverty is a leading cause of
land degradation, its alleviation through nature-based tourism is seen as a key to
prosperity in the region, which is helped by the fact that 'the fastest growing industry
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m the world, tourism, will have a growing need for one of the World's fastest
shrinking commodities: wilderness' (Fox, 2003: 63).
Both projects are part of broader plans. The UGCCA forms part of the Lubombo
Transfrontier Conservation Area (LTCA) spanning South Africa, Mozambique and
Swaziland. The idea behind transfrontier conservation areas is to link conservation
areas across international borders, as well as within countries, in order to restore
ancient migratory routes and biomes, create sustainable and eco-friendly land-use in
trans-frontier regions and generate income for communities that live there (Fox, 2003:
63). The UGCCA also forms a critical part of the Maputoland Centre of Endemism
that was highlighted by the World Conservation Union at the recent World Parks
Congress, which aims to enhance the biological component of the sustainable
development premise by bringing endangered species under protection (Bishop, 2003:
1). The Mabaso Game Reserve forms an expansion of the Greater St Lucia Wetlands
Conservation Authority (GSLWCA) (Bishop, 2003: 1).
Having determined the type of methodology used in this study, as well as introducing




Mabaso Community Game Reserve (MCGR): Project Analysis
5.1. Introduction
This chapter gives a historical overview of the MCGR as well as an outline of the
institutional structures that have developed in order to run the project. The chapter
goes on to describe the processes involved with the four-phases of implementation
that have almost been completed for the Mabaso project, namely: the community
awareness and consensus building phase; a government support and approval phase; a
resource assessment and partner identification phase; and a project construction and
operations phase. The discussion then looks at the various successes and challenges
that the MCGR project has encountered in terms of enhancing the social, economic
and sustainable livelihood strategy goals of the sustainable development premise
throughout the implementation process.
5.2. Mabaso Community Game Reserve: Historical Overview
The Mabaso Game Reserve was one of the first community conservation areas
initiated in South Africa. It falls under the authority of the Mabaso Tribal Authority
(MTA), and lies to the west, south and north of Lake Sibaya in the Ingwavuma
magisterial district (Figure 10, Appendix A) (Felton, 2000: 4). The concept of a CBC
game reserve in the Mabaso tribal area was first initiated by the Mabaso community
in the early 1990's with the help of the then KwaZulu-Natal Department of Nature
Conservation (now incorporated into the current provincial conservation agency)
(Venter, 2000: 4). Approximately 2700 hectares of communal land was established as
a community conservation area that was stocked with antelope and other plains game.
Prior to this, the major land uses of the area were moderate amounts of subsistence
agriculture mainly along the lakefront, some cattle herding and Ilala plant harvesting
for woven baskets (CC2, 2004: 2). The community had considered a tree plantation as
an alternative land use. However, a plantation was deemed to be too detrimental to the
water level of Lake Sibaya (CC2, 2004: 1). Consequently, the late Inkhosi (chief)
Zikhali of the Mabaso tribe travelled intensively throughout the Mabaso tribal area
discussing the proposal of a community conservation area with community members
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before deciding to go ahead with the idea (CC2, 2004: 1). According to Venter (2000:
5) the initial project failed due to the fact that:
"In the political unrest leading up to South Africa's 1994 political transition, a
dissident group within the community accused the community leadership of
selling the land. This group stirred up the broader community and they
subsequently invaded the reserve area, pulling down sections of the fence and
killing the game that had been introduced."
Despite this setback, the Inkhosi, after visiting and conducting meetings in various
different community wards, felt confident enough to re-initiate the CBC project and
approached the Wildlands Trust for advice and financial assistance (CC2, 2004: 1).
The Wildlands Trust agreed to help the CBNRM initiative at Mabaso on a funding
and advisory basis and initiated four major steps to try and necessitate the successful
implementation of the project. These four steps included:
1) A community awareness and consensus-building phase
2) A resource assessment and partner(s) identification phase
3) A government support and approval phase; and
4) A project construction and operations phase (Venter, 2000: 3).
The above four phases have almost been completed at Mabaso and have taken
roughly ten years to implement, emphasizing the long-term commitment necessary
from funding agencies, NGOs and skilled professionals necessary to ensure that the
CBC concept is able to transform from an idea into a working reality. The time frame
and implementation stages for the four phases at Mabaso are illustrated in Figure 6.
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Stage 6: Tourist operations start
·1 2 to 3 years.returning yields.
Figure 6. Project Process Map for the Mabaso Game Reserve (after Venter, 2004: 4-5)
The major challenge of any CBC project, during and after this initial implementation
process of the four phases, is to ensure that the project works continually on a
sustainable basis so that the economic, biological and cultural elements of the
sustainable development premise are developed with less of a reliance on outside
financial or advisory help. The future sustainability of the Mabaso CBC project
inevitably relies on the efficiency and effectiveness of the institutional structures that
have been set up to run and manage the scheme.
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5.3. Mabaso Community Game Reserve: Institutional Structures
The development of appropriate institutions at Mabaso has been an evolutionary
process, driven largely by the community leadership (Venter, 2000: 3). Detailed
descriptions of the institutions are detailed in Figure 7. These structures vary from the
existing traditional tribal councils (authorities) and development committees, to newly
formed tourism trusts or non-profit companies' known as Section 21 companies
(Venter, 2000: 3).
Ingonyama Trust (IT)
A joint venture between Department of Land Affairs (DLA)
and Zulu King. Determines land use rights over communal
land in KZN.
Leases land, and
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R600000
Figure 7: Mabaso Game Reserve Institutional Structure
59
Tribal authorities in KZN are made up of several community wards with up to four to
five hundred people in each ward (CC2, 2004: 2). Every ward within a tribal authority
is led and represented by an Nduna (ward chief). The entire jurisdiction of a tribal
authority area comes under the custodianship of the overall Inkhosi (tribal chief). The
actual tribal authority (or council), which is the representative overall decision-
making power of a tribal area, is made up of a tribe's Inkhosi and all the tribe's
Ndunas, including some extra community members (CC2, 2004: 2).
The tribal authorities in KZN make up the decision making body that determines all
land use rights within the tribal areas through the Ingonyama Trust Act (CC2, 2004:
2). Community members must write an application to their tribal authority if they
want permission for any form of livelihood or business proposition based on
communal land. The tribal authority will then discuss the application and decide to
either accept or decline the proposal (CC2, 2004: 2). If proposals are large or
contentious, then community committees are set up to act in an advisory capacity to
negotiate and steer proposals in the right direction to avoid conflict and gain
acceptance from the tribal council. These committees are made up of three elected
members and the Nduna from each of the most affected wards and two representatives
of the royal family (representing the Inkhosi) (CC2, 2004: 2). This exemplifies the
fact that African 'indigenous structures' can be democratic in so far as traditional
authorities consult their subjects whenever critical decisions need to be taken
(Ntsebeza, 2003: 80).
Due to the size of the Mabaso Game Reserve proposal and the number of people it
was deemed to affect, a steering committee was formed to guide the process. Three
members from each of the four most affected wards were elected onto the new
steering committee (CC2, 2004: 2). The Mabaso Game Reserve Steering Committee,
like all other tribal committees, does not have to take any definitive decisions, as they
are there only 'to look at the needs of the reserves, and the necessary requirements to
come up with a resolution, that then goes to the tribal authority' (CC2, 2004: 2). The
three elected members from each of the most affected wards are responsible for
bringing concerns of their wards to the steering committee so that these concerns can
be discussed and resolved. The elected members also serve as crucial communication
links between the committee and their fellow ward members. The Funjwa Section 21
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company, which is a recognised non-profit organisation, has been established to act as
a trust fund to look after the project's finances and to manage and run the reserve.
Members of both the steering committee and the tribal authority sit on the board of
the Funjwa 21 Company.
5.4. MCGR: Community Awareness and Consensus Building Phase
The implementation of the community awareness and consensus-building phase at
Mabaso required strong levels of communication between the Wildlands Trust, the
MCGR steering committee and the broader community. Communication to the
broader community relied heavily on the communication links between the elected
members on the steering committee and the community wards they represented. It
was essential that this community awareness and consensus-building phase was most
intense with those members of the community that were to be directly affected by any
form of accepted proposal. The Wildlands Trust aided the consensus building phase
amongst the wider community by funding several capacity building workshops aimed
at facilitating the establishment and/or development of appropriate CBC institutions
(Venter, 2000: 3). The Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT)
strongly advises that project implementers spend a lot of time and energy on this
initial phase in order to ensure the support of the overall community for the initiative
(Tourism KZN, 2004: 1).
5.5. Government Support and Approval Phase
Once it was felt that the Mabaso community had accepted the CBC concept, the next
stage involved securing land tenure rights over the designated land for the reserve. In
all other South African provinces, apart from KZN, development issues and rights
over tenure in communal lands falls under the sole jurisdiction of local government
municipalities that own the land. In KZN, prior to 1994, an agreement was made
between the former government and the Zulu Kingdom, which restored tenurial rights
over government owned communal lands to the Zulu King. The communal leadership
structures, that involve the various different tribal authorities and their Inkhosi who
act as custodians of the land on behalf of the king, subsequently became:
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"Responsible for allocating land for residential, agriculture and grazing
purposes. They were not, however, responsible for allocating land for any
business activities. Whilst they have a veto right, the state is responsible for
approving such proposals and entering into lease based agreements" (Venter,
2000: 7).
This joint venture agreement between the Department of Land Affairs and the Zulu
King, known as the Ingonyama Trust Act (ITA), has influence over about 2.7 million
hectares of tribal land in KZN and is administered by a board that is chaired by the
Zulu Monarch, King Goodwill Zwelethini, or his nominee for the benefit of the
community (Govender, 2002: 1).
As the intended Mabaso Game reserve is on ITA communal land it was imperative
that the Mabaso Tribal Authority gained tenurial permission from the ITA as an initial
step to develop a reserve. Once tenure of the land was secured from the ITA, it was
then necessary for the Mabaso Tribal Authority to gain government planning
permission from the relevant local authorities for the development of the lodges. The
next stage involved setting up a Section 21 company (non-profit organization that acts
as a trust fund) to administer and run the reserve.
The whole development and planning permission process needed to be in line with the
Development Facilitation Act (DFA). The DFA aims to overcome complex land use
planning regulations, and to clarify institutional roles and responsibilities, in an
attempt to circumvent the delays inherent in existing regulations, and thus 'fast track'
development (Rigby and Diab, 2003: 27). The provisions stipulated in the DFA,
heavily influence all development proposals submitted to local municipalities by
potential developers. Proposals not in line with DFA criteria are rejected. Rigby and
Diab (2003: 30) point out that sustainable development is a central theme of the
DFA's general principles for land development. In chapter one of the act the DFA
emphasizes that a municipality's policy, administrative practice and laws should
promote sustainable land development at the required scale by promoting the
sustained protection of the environment.
As the Ingonyama Trust Act is a joint venture between Land Affairs and the Zulu
King, any development applications to local municipalities should subsequently fit the
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necessary criteria set out by the DFA in order to satisfy the Department of Land
Affairs. This involves, amongst other things, ensuring that an Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA) survey is carried out. Completed application forms for any
development proposal in northern KZN, along with their EIA surveys, then have to be
submitted to the Department of Traditional and Environmental Affairs in Ulundi. The
application is then circulated within the Departments of Agriculture, Public Works
and Planning. If all departments are in agreement with the proposal, the developer is
issued with a 'permission to occupy' certificate (Tourism KZN, 2004: 1). The Mabaso
steering committee approached the Ingonyama Trust for support for their CBC
initiative in May 1999. The application was approved by January 2000 (Venter, 2000:
8).
After government permission was obtained, a Section 21 company was set up at
Mabaso to oversee and manage the implementation and running of the new reserve.
The company, known as the Funjwa Section 21 Company, is a non-profit organization
that is legally recognized and assisted by the government. The board of the Funjwa 21
Company, which includes representatives from both the tribal authority and project
steering committee, will eventually take over all the responsibilities of the current
reserve steering committee (CC1, 2004: 1; CC2, 2004: 3). The idea is that the
company will not only be responsible for the day-to-day running of the reserve, but
will also act as a trust fund for potential future profits that can then be used to enhance
the community through investments in social infrastructure.
A community run Section 21 company devolves decision-making powers directly to
the community, and thus avoids the CAMPFIRE scenario where the CBC project was
undermined by the fact that Local District Councils (LDC's) were given the authority
to first accumulate all the excess revenues from hunting initiatives and then to
subsequently distribute the benefits amongst the community. This process would not
be a problem if the distribution were conducted fairly. However, the involvement of
LDC's added an additional layer of bureaucracy and corruption that meant local
communities did not receive their full share of benefits from hunting revenues in good
time, which created an atmosphere of mistrust and resentment (lones and Murphree,
2001: 49).
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The existence of the ITA in KZN further reinforces the community's power due to the
fact that land tenure rights are in the hands of the tribal authorities, which does a lot to
diminish the power base of local municipalities making them very much a subordinate
partner in the CBC process. Due to the ITA, the diminished role of local
municipalities is a unique situation to KZN. This structure of incorporating traditional
authorities into the CBC initiative may not work elsewhere in South Africa. A
counter-argument is that in KZN too much power lies in the hands of tribal authorities
that often lack transparent democratic processes and gender equity. The issue of tribal
authorities will be discussed later in this chapter.
The Funjwa Section 21 company has been helped at Mabaso, in terms of capacity
building and skills development of the company's board members, by the GSLWP
Simunye (we are one) Community Tourism Association, which is an organization that
allows the 'champions' of the different CBC initiatives to meet, exchange ideas and
jointly lobby government and non-government organizations for funds, as well as to
market community conservation developments to the South African and international
tourism fraternity (Venter, 2004: 3). The Simunye Tourism Association is the
equivalent organisation to NACOBTA in Namibia, which serves the same purpose of
trying to promote CBC initiatives under one umbrella (lones, 2001: 173).
5.6. Partner Identification Phase and Project Construction and Operations Phase
The partner identification phase and project construction and operations phase of the
implementation process, which is linked to capacity building, skills development and
job creation at Mabaso, is heavily reliant on private sector investment and training in
nature-based tourism projects, which are at present in the early stages of being
developed. Three principles were essential for guiding this process (Venter, 2000: 8).
Firstly, the construction phase was based on the premise that development models
should maximize the realization of small and medium enterprises. Secondly, the
community should enter into professional employment contracts with their private
sector partners that stipulate a training framework aimed at progressively increasing
the proportion of locally employed staff. Thirdly, private sector partnerships were
structured around a turnover rental agreement of anywhere between 5-12% of
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turnover, which was aimed at guarantying an income flow to the community from
tour operations.
The Mabaso Tribal Authority gained leases and permission from the ITA for two
sixteen-bed lodge sites on the shores of Lake Sibaya. The tourist potential of both
these sites led to a joint venture agreement between the board of the Funjwa Section
21 Company and the Uthungula Resorts and Leisure Company that has 70% shares in
Lubombo Hotels (CCF, 2004: 2). Presently, a small eco-friendly tented luxury camp
is under construction at one of the sites and is almost complete. One advantage of the
ITA leasing system for CBC initiatives in KZN is that the community owns the land,
which theoretically strengthens their ability to negotiate with private investors. The
Damaraland Camp project in Namibia exemplifies this, as the local community
secured a lease agreement from the government for the camp area, which substantially
increased the community's negotiating powers with the private investor, enabling the
community to demand more in terms of joint ownership over the initiative (lones,
2001: 172).
The construction and completion of tourist accommodation is the final stage of the
ten-year implementation process (Figure 6), but is only the beginning for the
sustainable development realization phase that aims to accrue economic and cultural
benefits back to the community in return for the biological enhancement of the
MCGR. However, as the CAMPFIRE example (Chapter 3) illustrated, the
conservation return is not guaranteed as the local community may decide that the
economic incentives of investing any potential revenues earned from nature-based
tourism may be better spent on biologically unsustainable practices such as livestock
keeping. It is imperative, therefore, that the economic incentives offered for
conservation through tourism is complimented by educational efforts to inform the
community of the importance of conservation in order to ensure the sustainable
survival of resources. KZN Wildlife is making efforts to do this by training up
community conservation officers with the specific role of educating communities
about the importance of conservation (CC3, 2004: 2).
The next section discusses: the key measures taken by the Mabaso project
implementers in trying to avoid negative impacts on rural livelihood strategies as a
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result of the game reserve; what the major challenges were during the implementation
process; and what steps have been put in place so far to ensure the sustainability of the
project.
5.7.1. Barriers to Implementation and Sustainability
Community acceptance and support for the CBC concept at Mabaso was one of the
hardest challenges faced by the project implementers and still is to this day. Despite
much effort to convey the CBC conceptual message to the community through
numerous meetings and workshops the project has encountered several instances of
physical resentment towards the reserve over the past few years, as demonstrated by
the continued vandalism of the reserve's fences. This is partly due to the fact that
South Africa's historical 'fortress conservation' approach has instilled high levels of
suspicion, hostility and skepticism within rural communities towards conservation
issues (Venter, 2000: 8). Consequently, many rural people feel that CBC initiatives
are a form of land grab in the guise of conservation with promises of economic
benefits. High levels of suspicion subsequently culminate in acts such as vandalism of
the fences that undermine the achievement of the biological and economic goals of
the sustainable development model (Figure 1). It is imperative, therefore, that
economic benefits from CBC approaches accrue relatively quickly back to the
Mabaso community in the form of jobs and funds generated for social infrastructure
development. This must happen in order to reassure the community that they are the
targeted beneficiaries of the conservation efforts.
5.7.2. Political Tension as a Barrier to Implementation
An additional reason as to why the CBC implementation process was undermined at
Mabaso is because of originally unforeseen political tensions between the Mabaso and
the neighbouring Mbila communities. Historically, the tension between the Mabaso
and Mbila tribes was generated as a result of conflicting views over their tribal
boundaries when the reserve was first implemented. Several Mbila households had to
move off land designated for the new game reserve as it came under control of the
Mabaso Tribal Authority. A legal battle between the two tribes ensued for more than
two years as the Mbila's claimed they were being forcibly removed, violently
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assaulted and prevented from accessing their resources. They also laid attempted
murder charges against the Mabaso chief, Justice Nxumalo (SABC NEWS, 2003: 1).
The Mabaso tribe won the court case after it emerged, during cross-examination of the
Mbila Chief and others, that none of the allegations were true (Moneyweb KZN,
2003). Despite a court injunction allowing the CBC initiative to go ahead at Mabaso,
as well as the lawful recognition of the tribal boundaries, vandalism against the fences
has continued.
There is a possibility that unforeseen political undercurrents set to destabilise the
tribal authority structure is fueling the continued vandalism of the fences (CC1, 2004:
2). The African National Congress (ANC) would ideally like to see the powers of
tribal authorities diminished so that democratically elected government municipalities
can take charge of all major decision making processes (Ntsebeza, 2003: 56). A
mechanism for relocating control of tenure to individuals is the new Communal Land
Rights Bill (CLRB), put forward by the ANC, which aims to give individuals and
groups private tenure over fonnerly government owned communal lands. This bill
effectively undennines the Tribal Authority structures (CC1, 2004: 2). The most
recent published draft of the CLRB 'is almost less overtly pro-chief than earlier
versions, with a maximum of 25% of positions on local administrative bodies to be
occupied by traditional leaders, in an ex-officio capacity' (Cousins, 2002: 2). These
issues are politically very contentious and sensitive in KwaZulu-Natal due to the fact
that the CLRB is likely to undennine the ITA, despite promises by the ANC that the
ITA will remain intact. The ANC's major opposition in KZN, the Inkatha Freedom
Party (IFP), additionally supports the ITA and traditional structures, which are seen as
major factors uniting the Zulu Kingdom that fonns the IFP's major support base
(Ntsebeza, 2003: 72).
It can be argued that the current conflict between the Mabaso and Mbila communities
comes down to politics, as the Mabaso are apparently predominantly influenced by
the IFP and the Mbila are mainly supporters of the ANC (CC1, 2004: 2). It is thought
that outsiders have put pressure on the Mbila community to undennine the Mabaso
community conservation initiative in order to show that communal property structures
do not work effectively (CC1, 2004: 2). The Mbila community has subsequently
attempted to portray the Mobaso Inkhosi as being a 'warlord' (CC1, 2004: 1) as
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evidenced by the failed attempted murder charges (Moneyweb KZN, 2003). It needs
to be stated as a weakness of this study, however, that more research would need to be
done, by interviewing members of the Mbila tribe, in order to ascertain whether the
motives behind the vandalism of the fences was entirely politically motivated.
In terms of resolving the Mabaso and Mbila conflict, the Wildlands Trust is
considering putting a funding condition forward to the Mabaso Funjwa Section 21
board, which will suggest that the Mbila are shareholders in the lodge development
plans, thus giving them an economic incentive to help the new reserve succeed (CC1,
2004: 3). This supports Dzingarai's (2003, 445) argument, based on studies done on
Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE program in Binga District near Lake Kariba, that the
monopoly on benefits held by the 'producer communities', those communities that
share territory with and benefit from wildlife and CBC initiatives, serve to antagonize
non-members and, in some cases, encourages them to seek the destruction of what
they come to regard as costly wildlife management techniques. In effect, the exclusion
of outside social groups makes these groups hostile to the management initiative and
its adherents, which engenders animosity towards wildlife (Dzingarai, 2003: 446).
Dzingarai suggests that a broader inclusion is necessary by spreading the benefits
from CBC initiatives to outsiders and not just the 'core group' (Dzingarai, 2003: 458).
The proposal for sharing benefits with the Mbila tribe has presently not been put to
the two communities and may be too much of a bitter pill to swallow for the Mabaso
leadership given the bad history between the two tribes.
The problem between the Mabaso and Mbila communities may not simply be just
down to political preference; as contested borders between two communities
supporting the same political party may also just as easily occur. The main lesson
learnt from the Mabaso versus Mbila conflict, however, has been the need to
determine the political preference of areas beforehand, and what the implications of
competing political outlooks mean for the implementation process of CBC initiatives
in the future. For example, if the philosophy of the CLRB, which is supported by the
ANC and others, is accepted in parliament, then it is likely to have a negative impact
on CBC initiatives in the future, as it would be harder to consolidate large areas of
individually owned land for conservation purposes.
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5.7.3. Communal versus Individual Tenure as a Barrier to Implementation
It is argued that the ambitious attempt by the CLRB to replace indigenous tenure
systems with western style property rights, that have proved effective vehicles of
economic development in societies organized around market principles, will be
inappropriate and ineffective in the African context for the following reasons:
"African systems of land tenure are based on the principle that everyone
within the community of origin has rights to land, but that individual rights are
balanced against their obligations to the social group. Rights are thus shared
and relative. Systems tend to be inclusive, not exclusive, and rights and
obligations are held at a number of levels of social organization, from the
neighbourhood to the village to the larger community. Rights in community-
based land tenure systems can be very secure, and ensure that access to land is
available as a vital safety net for the poor. The key to their resilience in Africa
is people's preference for socially regulated access to resources" (Cousins,
2002: 3).
Cultural structures for land tenure and decision-making, through the inclusion of the
tribal authority, have been incorporated into the Mabaso CBC initiative. The inclusion
of local leadership satisfies the CBC principle (Table 1) of acknowledging local
structures and ensuring local leadership fully support the CBC initiative (DEAT:
2003: 21). There is a danger that an elite leadership group may be created, which can
be avoided if rights and duties are spread out and clearly defined in order to broaden
the leadership role and even out power (DEAT, 2003: 46). In the South African
context, the inclusion of tribal structures has both positive and negative effects. The
fact that cultural institutions are being used to facilitate and manage the CBC
initiative is a positive feature in terms of cultural enhancement, as it augments
traditional leadership structures that are coming under increasing pressure to
dismantle and adopt westernized approaches to governance. One perspective of
traditional structures of governance is that these have been around for hundreds of
years and have proven to work relatively efficiently and equitably in terms of the
community's access to resources on a sustainable basis. Anstey and De Sousa's
(2001) study in Mozambique's Chimanimani district supports this perspective, as
their findings found traditional institutions to be strong, efficient and requiring lower
inputs then western techniques of conservation. It has been suggested that there is
value in African concepts of power as opposed to a western-style liberal democracy:
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"Various elements of leadership had their roots in different traditions, sectors
of population, and localities. That was why power, as domination, did not exist
there. Rather it was plurality of authority stemming from the traditions of
different segments of society, which ensured that the whole population of a
particular area shared ideas, and practices related to public arrangements, and
recognized the leaders who in turn respected the rules and accepted the
influence of the population on public affairs" (Skalnik, 1996: 111 in Ntsebeza,
2003: 59).
As a result, traditional structures still command huge amounts of respect from the
community, and therefore are a necessity in terms of consolidating communities
cooperation to work together towards a given set goal.
5.7.4. Democracy and Gender Inequality as Barriers to implementation.
The counter-arguments to utilizing traditional structures of leadership are that they
tend to be non-democratic and gender inequitable in nature. The tribal authority at
Mabaso is very much 'influenced by the Inkhosi, which means there is rarely a
dissenting voice against him' (CCl, 2004: 2). The relative success of a CBC initiative
can therefore be dependent on the dedication, support and enlightenment of the tribal
authority leadership. There is supporting evidence that suggests tribal structures are
losing support in certain areas. For example in 1995 the IFP called for a boycott of
local government elections in retaliation for the ANC's move to establish local
municipalities in tribal authority areas. The boycott was not supported by the
population, casting suspicion on the supposed popularity of traditional authorities
(Ntsebeza, 2003: 75).
The tribal structure does, however, incorporate certain democratic principles. For
example, setting up a committee for large and controversial proposals involves three
members from each affected ward being voted onto a committee to discuss the
particular proposal that affects them. This is a relatively transparent process as the
steering committee for the Mabaso Reserve is technically open to any member of the
community. To avoid congestion at meetings, however, the main role of the elected
ward members is to go back to their wards to discuss the issues raised at steering
committee meetings with their fellow ward members (CC2, 2004: 2). Regular imbisos
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(meeting) then take place at the respective affected wards to discuss their
representative's stance at the next steering committee meeting (CC2, 2004: 2).
At the Mabaso Steering Committee meeting held at the Mabaso Tribal Court house,
shown in plate 1 (Appendix B), on the 2ih of January 2004 there were thirteen people
present. Four of the thirteen members were from outside the community, with two
representing the Wildlands Trust, one each from KZN Wildlife and the local
municipality. Out of the remaining nine people representing the community, three
were women, making a ratio of one woman to two men on the committee from the
local community (CCF, 2004: 3). This demonstrates that women are eligible to be
voted onto traditional committees and take positions of some authority within the
community structures. However, more needs to be done to encourage the whole tribal
process to become more gender equitable. There are signs that the present Inkhosi
Nxumalo at Mabaso is taking the initiative on this issue, as at a recent tribal authority
meeting he insisted that more women and youth should be voted onto tribal
committees and be represented on the tribal authority (CC2, 2004: 2). The shift to
stronger participation from women and youth may be the result of tribal authorities
recognizing the importance donor funding agencies attach to gender equity (CC4,
2004: 2). The Wildlands trust has set in place a funding condition that stipulates that
there should be an equal division of labour between men and women in all jobs
created by the initiative in order to further enhance gender equity in the CBC initiative
(CCF, 2004: 3). The problem with funding conditions is that they can be seen as a
dictatorial device by outsiders, which risks diminishing the community's sense of
control and ownership over the project, thus weakening the social element of the
sustainable development model.
5.7.5. Communication as a Barrier to Implementation
Communication, or the lack of it, has been cited at Mabaso as one of the most crucial
issues that has slowed and undermined the whole project process. Tribal committees
are designed to filter information through to the entire community where major issues
are then discussed at imbisos. At Mabaso it is felt that this has not been happening
properly (CC2, 2004: 3). This has led to a major breakdown in communication
between the steering committee of the game reserve and the broader community,
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which has led to rising levels of mistrust and suspicion (CC2, 2004: 3). A prominent
member of the Mabaso Steering Committee stated that:
"The biggest problem is information to the community. The only way of
solving this problem is by restructuring the committee and getting capable
people to do the work by insuring that they pass information back to the wards
they represent. The people who cut fences have not been well informed by
their representatives" (CC2, 2004: 3).
The breakdown in communication at Mabaso, which is a fundamental reason as to
why the whole CBC process is often so slow in getting off the ground, is exacerbated
by the fact that there is a high absenteeism rate of steering committee members
attending meetings, which slows the process down as it becomes harder to co-ordinate
the decision making process, and means vital information is often not transferred back
to the affected wards (CCF, 2004: 3). Transport was given as the major reason as to
why members of the steering committee could often not attend (CCF, 2004: 3). In
rural areas, such as Mabaso, it is recognised that the opportunity cost of time given up
for steering committee meetings is often very high in terms of labour hours that could
be spent securing their livelihood strategies elsewhere, and which may be a further
cause for the high absenteeism rate. Absenteeism may also simply be attributable to
apathy and lack of commitment by community members.
In order to speed up the CBC process, communication between stakeholders needs to
be enhanced. For this to happen, project implementers may need to think about
budgeting for transportation costs of steering committee members. Additionally,
economic incentives, such as a meeting attendance wage, to lower the opportunity
costs of attending meetings and to entice committee members to come to the
meetings, could be possible ways around the collapse in traditional tribal authority
communication procedures that seem to be occurring at Mabaso. The cost of doing
this would obviously have to be offset with the potential benefits of speeding up the
communication processes and enhancing the level of trust amongst the community.
The disadvantage, however, of providing incentives is that people may attend simply
to get some income. There is also space for corruption as people may hold meetings,
when there is no need to have a meeting, in order to get paid.
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5.7.6. Government Bureaucracy as a Barrier to Implementation
Government bureaucracy presented the Mabaso Steering Committee with a major
challenge in the early stages of the Mabaso project implementation process. It took
approximately two and a half years to obtain the necessary development permission
from the various different government departments (CC1, 2004: 2-3). Venter (2000:
7) points out that:
"In South Africa this procedure is proving to be a cumbersome and time-
consuming process.... There are currently over 90 different pieces of
legislation, which affect this process, resulting in substantial overlap between
different time delays as proposals are shuttled between different departments.
The government is currently attempting to streamline the process, with limited
success."
The slow rate of government functioning is characteristic of CBC projects in other
parts of South Africa. A study carried out by Viljoen and Naicker (2000: 140) on the
Mavhaluni bush camp, a joint-venture agreement between the local community and a
private investor in South Africa's Northern Province, found that finalizing the
permission to occupy (PTO) certificates was a major stumbling block to tourist
development on communal land, as the developers were not prepared to invest capital
in fixed infrastructure without having security of tenure. This delayed the
development considerably until a final PTO was issued.
One of the most important guidelines to dealing with government bureaucracy and to
speed up future projects, as a result of the Mabaso experience, is the need to develop a
relationship with officials who take decisions (CCl, 2004:4). It is useful for the
project administrators to establish and understand government criteria and what it is
the government needs to see being achieved (CC1, 2004: 4). By doing this, project
implementers will be able to act accordingly, in the initial stages, to meet government
department needs, and subsequently speed up the implementation process when it
comes to dealing with the different departments.
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5.7.7. Donor Dependence as a Barrier to Implementation
The long-term sustainability of the Mabaso project will be achieved when income
generation and management capabilities are not reliant on external support from the
Wildlands Trust and KZN Wildlife. The presence of the Wildlands Trust, as a funding
and advisory organisation, has been crucial to the survival of the Mabaso project thus
far. An over-relaince by the Mabaso Community was emphasised by the collapse of
the CBC process when the Wildlands Trust started to withdraw (CC1, 2004: 3). The
Trust brings a lot of influence to the table in the form of funders, future investors, as
well as KZN Wildlife, and without this back-bone the process would essentially fail
(CC1, 2004: 3). While the presence of outside support is a key principle of the CBC
concept (Table 1) there is a danger that the CBC initiative may become over-reliant
on outside expertise.
In terms of the Mabaso community taking stronger managerial responsibility for the
reserve, it has been suggested that the steering committee meet in the middle of every
month without non-community members, and then again at the end of each month
with the representatives from the Wildlands Trust and KZN Wildlife (CCF, 2004: 3).
The aim of this exercise would theoretically mean that more decisions concerning the
reserve would be arrived at without the influence of the outside experts. This would
be a crucial step to reduce the reliance of the community on outsiders for advice. The
consequent build up of their confidence in decision making would enhance their sense
of ownership over the CBC initiative, making the whole process more culturally and
socially sustainable in the long term. This would also potentially avoid the negative
effect of a sudden and immediate withdrawal of external support.
Complete ownership of any CBC initiative needs to ensure that the rules and
regulations of the projects are determined and enforced by the community themselves
(Table 1). If it is felt that outsiders implement the rules of the new reserve, as is the
case with fortress conservation methods, then resentment towards CBC initiatives is
likely to build up as a result. At Mabaso:
"One key issue that concerned the community was the inclusion of two
wetlands areas in the conservation area. These areas were farmed extensively
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for subsistence purposes and the introduction of game, particularly dangerous
game, would impact on their farming operations and the farmers' access to the
area. Following a series of community meetings, the community conservation
area's boundaries were redefined to exclude these wetland areas" (Venter,
2000: 5).
The fact that it was decided by the Mabaso community not to fence around the arable
plots of land on the lake front is a positive example of the community taking charge of
the process and deciding exactly how they want the reserve to evolve and function. It
also exemplifies the important requirement of the conservation effort not to detract
from rural livelihood strategies, which in this instance involved fertile land on the
lakeshore. The Steering Committee decided that no farming would subsequently be
allowed within the reserve perimeter. The harvesting of Ilala leaves, used for
weaving, still continues within the reserve, to allow for sustainable livelihood
strategies. However, the cutting of Ilala plants for wine has been banned from within
the reserve, as in order to get the wine, collectors need to tap into the roots, which
eventually kills the plant (CC1, 2004: 3). In this case a balance has been achieved
between economic and conservation goals of the sustainable development model.
Seven game guards have so far been appointed to patrol the reserve and are
accountable to and paid by the Funjwa Section 21 board. The rules and jurisdiction of
the reserve have subsequently been recognised by the police and several convictions
have already occurred (CC2, 2004: 3), satisfying Ostrom's criteria for sustaining
common property institutions (Table 2). A further positive decision in relation to the
community management of the reserve was recently taken by the steering committee
in officially appointing a manager of the reserve, and clearly stating that he is
responsible for the security of the reserve (CCF, 2004: 4). This is an important step in
terms of clearly defining people's job descriptions and spreading responsibility in
order to give people their deserved status in the roles they play, as well as creating
individuals who ultimately can be held accountable for the day to day management of
the reserve.
75
5.8.1. MCGR: Towards Economic Sustainability
As communal land is held 'in trust' by the Zulu King in KZN, or the Minister of Land
Affairs in other parts of South Africa, neither individuals nor communities are able to
offer trust land as security for loans from financial institutions (Viljoen and Naicker,
2000: 136). For this reason, the long-term financial sustainability of the Mabaso
project depends on the reserve's ability to generate income from private investment in
tourism ventures. The major incentives for any investors in the Mabaso area are its
unique site and scenery, as well as its close proximity to the greater St Lucia Wetlands
Park (GSLWP), which is a growing tourism destination (CC1, 2004: 3). At present the
steering committee is identifying and experimenting with various different tourism
activity concessions, other than accommodation, that they could potentially outsource
to private companies. At Mabaso, concessions for boat rides, canoeing, 4x4 trails,
horse riding and hunting have been considered and in some instances tested. The
Mabaso game reserve's close proximity with Sodwana Bay, South Africa's premier
diving destination, is potentially very advantageous in terms of the reserve's ability to
attract visitors as an alternative day trip outing for divers and their families when they
are not diving (CCF, 2004: 3). It is hoped that once the two lodges are established,
and regular visitors start coming both for long term visits and day trips, then a market
for local produce such as vegetables and traditional crafts will be established, which
will also directly enhance local peoples livelihood strategies (CC2, 2004: 3). Local
produce and traditional crafts can provide supplemental income in CBC projects. For
example women community members benefited from selling locally grown produce
and locally made traditional crafts within the Vulamehlo Handicraft Project in the
Spioenkop Nature Reserve (Kruger and Verster, 2001: 245).
The Mabaso community needs to outsource the identified conceSSIOns to private
firms, as the community is reliant on these firms to provide the revenue to market the
area and provide the necessary funds for training purposes. A percentage of the
revenues generated by the various concessions, which will be determined through
negotiations between the Funjwa Section 21 board and the firm interested in the
concession, will then go back into the Funjwa Section 21 Company that will look
after the funds on behalf of the overall community. It has been agreed so far, with the
Lubombo Tours and Safaris Company that 10% of the potential gross turnover
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generated by the accommodation will go to the Funjwa Section 21 Company (CC1,
2004: 1).
The issue of consolidating the joint venture agreement between the Funjwa board and
Lubombo Tours and Safaris, by finalizing the deal and providing an ultimatum of a
two year contract, was brought up at the January 2004 steering committee meeting by
the Wildlands Trust representative (CCF, 2004: 3). It was recognised that although
Lubombo tours had done a lot for the reserve so far, it was felt that they had missed
out on a large income generating opportunity over the recent festive season by not
having their cruise boat in operation or attracting any visitors for that duration (CCF,
2004: 3). The community is reliant on the private firm for investment, marketing, job
creation and training purposes; however, the community also needs the private
investor to fulfill its end of the bargain by filling beds with visitors and generating
income for the community. If this does not happen, then it is up to the community to
get firm and make ultimatums to achieve the results it wants to see. One suggested
ultimatum was to put some of the concessions, such as the boat rides and canoeing, up
for tender in the New Year so that other potential private operators can compete for
the concessions. This emphasises the importance of the community needing to take
charge of the situation and setting the conditions necessary for ensuring the private
operators perform to their maximum capacities by offering them enough incentives to
want to invest in the area, whilst at the same time confirming the terms and conditions
in order to put the investors under a bit of pressure to perform within realistic time
frames.
The eventual goal of the Mabaso CBC project is to ensure that, through the tourist
concessions on offer; enough income will be generated by the reserve for the Funjwa
Section 21 Company to take over the complete running of the project without outside
financial help. The company will be responsible for re-investing money in the reserve
to sustain and improve its infrastructure, such as roads, fencing and animal stocks. A
20% lid on company cost expenditure from the income generated by the reserve will
be set in place to prevent corruption and over spending (CC1, 2004: 2).
The hope is that the reserve will generate enough income to exceed the running costs
of the reserve so as to become non-reliant on donor funding and which will enable the
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Funjwa board to start accumulating money for social infrastructure spending within
the community. Economic growth directed at community development is an important
principle of sustainable development (Table 1). As the project has not reached this
stage at present, the exact way of deciding how any excess funds should be spent
within the community has not been officially determined. Conflicting ways of
distributing any excess income have been put forward. One procedure is to rely on
traditional structures, whereby the board of the Funjwa Section 21 Company will have
to report to the tribal authority, which will then decide how the money will be spent.
This process works on the premise that the needs of the tribe are known by the tribal
authority as a result of the representation of each ward by their Ndunas who sit on the
tribal council (CC2, 2004: 2). This is not a very transparent or democratic process,
and subsequently could lead to the creation of distrust amongst the community.
The second procedure, of how to distribute the benefits is to organise a large public
gathering, whereby a shortlist of wanted investment suggestions from those gathered
will be put forward. A row voting system, involving people lining up behind the
investment choice they would most like to see implemented first, could possibly be
introduced (CC1, 2004: 4). The advantage of this is that the process is completely
transparent for everyone to see. It could, however, be a long drawn out process in
terms of agreeing on the initial short list. There is also no anonymity that could lead to
bullying and repercussions. Intimidation could force people to stand in rows most
wanted by power yielding members of the community especially as there is still
immense respect for indunas in rural parts ofKZN.
5.8.2. MCGR: Towards Sustainable Livelihood Strategies
Both proposals for distributing excess income generated by the reserve agree that in
order to encourage equity throughout the entire community, the wider Mabaso
community and not just those wards most affected by the reserve should also benefit
from social infrastructural investments. The theory suggests, however, that those
people most affected by the wards should ultimately see quick economic benefits
accrue back to them in the early stages in order to secure their support for the
initiative and ensure that their sustainable livelihood strategies (Table 1 and Figure 2)
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are not compromised but enhanced by the reserve through the creation of job
opportunities.
The Mabaso project has achieved this in several ways during the four implementation
phases. Firstly, the Funjwa board identified the number of people it could employ in
the initial stages as game guards and fence builders within its given budget. People
from the most affected wards were then given preference when it came to availability
of these job opportunities (CC2, 2004: 2). Each affected ward decided who would get
the jobs through a simple but transparent process of publicly picking names out of a
hat (CC2, 2004: 2). As KwaMboma was deemed the most affected ward of all, four
out of the seven game guards came from this ward. Individuals from each of the other
three most affected wards made up the remainder (CC2, 2004: 2).
Secondly, it has been proposed that households living near the reserve should be
offered shares in the Funjwa 21 Company in return for their labour in maintaining the
fences and roads (CCl, 2004: 4). This will offer those households direct economic
incentives, in the form of dividends for their labour, which will hopefully further
encourage their support for the success and profitability of the reserve. The more
profitable the reserve is, then the more dividends these households will receive. So it
is in their interest to see the reserve succeed.
Thirdly, the livelihood strategies of women in the Mabaso area could be enhanced by
a proposal, put forward by the reserve's Steering Committee, which involves the
sustainable harvesting of Ilala (Hyphaene Coriacea) leaves. Ilala leaves are used for
weaving mats, baskets and in the production of brooms, as illustrated in Plate 2
(Appendix B). Currently individuals collect Ilala leaves and sell them to businessmen
from Durban for R6 per bundle (CCF, 2004: 2). Bundles of Ilala subsequently fetch
up to R15 in Durban. It has therefore been proposed that the Funjwa Section 21 board
buys the Ilala bundles from the women for RIO and then store the leaves at the
Mabaso Game reserve entrance where there is a small secure warehouse that was
donated to the Funjwa board by the roads department (Plate 3: Appendix B). The
board will make arrangements with a local transport company to then transport and
sell the Ilala in Durban. This way the Ilala pickers will get R4 extra per bundle, and
the Funjwa board will generate profits from selling the Ilala that will then be ploughed
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back into maintaining the reserve (CCF, 2004: 2). The process is still in the cost-
benefit analysis stage. Women present at the January 2004 steering committee
meeting raised issues of concern about whether they would get paid for the Ilala up
front upon delivery. Once again, careful consideration of local needs and desires will
have to be considered through participatory processes before any final decisions are
made. However, this is a good example of an initiative designed to enhance rural
peoples' livelihoods, generate a little more income for the financial sustainability of
the reserve and diversify income generation away from an over-reliance on tourism.
5.9. Summary
The Mabaso Game Reserve CBC initiative has proven to be an exceptionally large
learning curve for everyone involved and emphasises the long-term time frames
necessary to see CBC initiatives through to fruition. Issues of inter-tribal political
factions, democracy, gender inequality, communication weaknesses, government
bureaucracy, an over-reliance on outside help for both financial and advisory help, as
well as a lack of private sector commitment to achieving their end of the bargain by
attracting tourists and filling bed spaces, have undermined the Mabaso project
implementation process. Solutions such as including the Mbila clan in the future
benefit sharing initiatives, learning how government works in terms of their criteria
and who best to deal with, providing transport or incentives for steering committee
members to attend meetings, encouraging the reserve's chosen community members
to take on more of a role in the decision making process and setting strict ultimatums
to the private sector enterprises through contracts to deliver the goods, have all been
suggested as ways of overcoming the respective problems encountered by the project
implementers.
The next chapter provides a case study analysis of the Usuthu Gorge CBC initiative,
which exemplifies how the Wildlands Trust who is involved in both projects, has been
able to learn from the MCGR to enhance and ease the Usuthu project.
80
Chapter Six
Usuthu Gorge Conservation Area (UGCCA): Project Analysis
6.1. Introduction
This chapter looks at the challenges and successes faced by the Usuthu Gorge
Community Conservation Area (UGCCA) initiative in the initial implementation
phase, and offers several comparisons to the Mabaso Community Game Reserve
(MCGR) project analysed in Chapter Five. It begins with a historical over view of the
UGCCA and an outline of the evolving institutional structures. As the UGCCA
project has not currently completed the four-phase implementation process identified
for CBC initiatives (Chapter Four), it is not possible to give a holistic view of all the
challenges faced by the project as it enters into each new phase. Instead this case
study analyses the early implementation processes of the UGCCA initiative to
establish how the project has enhanced the social, economic and livelihood strategies
of the Mathenjwa people living in the area, which should in turn induce strong
positive attitudes and actions to satisfy the conservation goals of the sustainable
development model (Figure 1).
6.2. UGCCA: Historical Overview
The UGCCA, situated on the South African border with Mozambique, Swaziland and
located between the Lubombo Hills in the West and the Ndumu Game Reserve in the
East, was first conceived in the early 1990s when the local Mathenjwa tribe was
awarded a land restitution claim over the area. Members from the Mathenjwa Tribal
Authority subsequently became interested in the notion of trying to develop the area
through conservation and tourism initiatives (CC4, 2004: 1). The tribal authority
negotiated with their communities to release approximately 6 160 hectares of land for
the purpose of the reserve (IES, 2000: 1). The Wildlands Trust was then approached
to help initiate the CBC proposal.
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From a conservation perspective, the idea of converting the Usuthu Gorge area into a
reserve was very appealing to the Wildlands Trust because it fitted in with the
development of the Lubombo Trans-Frontier Conservation Area. The longer term
vision of the development includes consolidating the Usuthu Gorge, Ndumo Game
Reserve, a portion of the Mbangweni corridor and the Tembe Elephant Park into one
large continuous conservation area of up to 60 000 ha in size (Peace Parks
Foundation, 2002: 7). The creation of such a large area under protection strengthens
the biological component of the sustainable development model. The establishment of
corridors linking un-spoilt areas ofwilderness and the expansion of wild areas, as well
as securing the survival of wild lands for future generations is also a key principle for
an effective CBC initiative to be deemed a success through the maintenance and
enhancement of natural resources of an area (DEAT, 2003: 21).
6.3. UGCCA: Institutional Structures
The Usuthu Gorge project was initiated two years later than Mabaso and is therefore
behind in terms of implementation and development (CC1, 2004: 3). The Wildlands
Trust has benefited greatly from the invaluable lessons learnt from the Mabaso
experience, as a result it can bring new knowledge to the more recent project, and is
better able to pre-empt potential problems (CC4, 2004: 2). Consequently there are
subtle differences between the institutional structures, as well as implementation
processes, that have been adopted at Usuthu in comparison to the Mabaso process.
The institutional structures at Usuthu are almost identical to the ones outlined for
Mabaso (Figure 7), except that a Section 21 Company has not yet been formed and no
definite concessions have been decided on. In terms of funding, the Wildlands Trust
has raised and donated an initial R900 000 interest free loan to finance the Usuthu
project, as well as to cover the estimated RIO per hectare management fee per annum
necessary to run the project (CCF, 2004: 1). In addition to this, the Trust has also
donated R300 000 for the training of guides and game guards. The KZN Wildlife
department has also donated a population of game animals in order to increase the
viability of the reserve. At present, there is also a funding proposal in place with the
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism Poverty Relief Fund for R6
million to be used in the development of the reserve's infrastructure and tourism
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initiatives (CC4, 2004: 2). These expenditure figures illustrate the expensive initial
costs of setting up CBC initiatives and the reliance on the donor agencies to support
the concept.
The Usambaras project in Tanzania found that it was essential for the long-term
sustainability of CBC initiatives to have technical expertise focused on one project
throughout the entire implementation process (Adams, 2001, 245). The UGCCA
Steering Committee, which makes it unique from Mabaso, has a designated project
manager, namely Sue McClintock from the Wildlands Trust, whose job it is to
provide the project with technical expertise and give the initiative direction and
momentum. The rest of the Usuthu steering committee is made up of representatives
from four of the most affected wards in the area, including the respective Nduna's of
these wards and representatives from KZN Wildlife (CC3, 2004: 1).
6.4. UGCCA: Project Implementation Successes and Challenges
The implementation process at UGCCA appears to have experienced several
advantages over the Mabaso initiative. Firstly, the project coordinator, the Wildlands
Trust, has experience from the Mabaso initiative and can therefore predict and counter
certain obstacles. As such, the Wildlands Trust has been able to pre-empt a lot of
potential problems at the Usuthu Gorge project site, examples of which are
highlighted later. Secondly, there are no conflicting political undercurrents within and
between the Mathenjwa community and their neighbours, the Tembe Tribal
Authority. The Tembe Tribal authority has bought into a CBC joint-venture initiative
of its own, involving the Tembe Elephant Park. Thirdly, the legal parameters and
property rights of the Mathenjwa Tribal Authority are clearly identified as a result of
the recently settled land restitution claim. This is important as limited security of land
tenure often acts as a deterrent to investment by private sector developers who place a
premium on secure land tenure arrangements (Viljoen and Naicker, 2000: 136).
Clearly defined property rights therefore go a long way to ensuring that CBC
initiatives will not be disrupted by any land disputes in the future. The MCGR is an
example of an initiative that experienced huge set backs as a result of unclear property
rights, as well as political differences, which led to the disruption of the reserve's
fences and unnerved potential private investors. Fourthly, the Wildlands Trust has
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realized the need for a specific project manager of the UGCCA project whose focus is
purely project specific and who is a member of the UGCCA Steering Committee
(CC4, 2004: 1). This specific role ensures the full attention and long-term
commitment to the project, on an advisory basis, of a skilled professional to provide
direction for the initiative, and is one of the many initiatives to reduce the chance of
the project failing. This was also a co-requisite identified from the experience of the
East Usambaras Agricultural Development and Environmental Conservation Project
in Tanzania (Adams, 2001: 345).
Despite the advantages the Usuthu Gorge project has experienced so far, there have
also been a number of challenges in the implementation process. Ironically one of
theses challenges has come from the KZN Wildlife officer in charge of the Ndumu
Game Reserve who, apparently adopting the fortress conservation school of thought,
was skeptical about opening the small section of Ndumu Reserve fence for the
creation of the link corridor with the UGCCA (CC3, 2004: 2). The Wildlands Trust
and Usuthu Steering Committee apparently had to approach his superiors to gain
permission for the small section of fence to be dropped. This case exemplifies that
efforts to promote the CBC concept must not just focus on the local communities
involved. Fortress conservation is still very prevalent, which means attention must
also be placed on trying to convert the game guard from wielding a stick to using a
carrot, or at least a combination of using both a carrot and a stick.
Communication between the steering committee and the broader community was
cited as a major problem slowing down the implementation process at the UGCCA, as
was the case in the Mabaso Game Reserve Project. The Wildlands Trust is currently
suggesting that in order to overcome this problem, a full-time field worker should be
employed to play an interim role between the Usuthu Steering Committee and the
broader community (CC4, 2004: 3). It is important that any communication link set
up with the broader community conveys the right messages. Realistic outcomes and
decisions of the project coordinators should be conveyed in a truthful manner in order
to avoid raising expectations (CC3, 2004: 2). Communication links also have to work
as a two way process, and it is therefore important that the steering committee
engages with what the community wants as the CBC process evolves (CC3, 2004: 2).
A fieldworker with the specific aim of acting as a communication bridge between the
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Steering Committee and the community could help ensure that the necessary
communication requirements are achieved to make the whole CBC process run more
effectively. It is also very important in addition to this to ensure that accurate records
of what has been said and by whom are kept to minimize disputes further down the
line.
The UGCCA steering committee faces the same issues of gender inequality and
undemocratic principles that the Mabaso initiative encountered when incorporating
tribal authority structures into the management organization of the project. The
chairman of the UGCCA steering committee is a nominee of the Mathenjwa Inkhosi.
This differs from the Mabaso Community Game Reserve where the Inkhosi is the
actual chairman of the steering committee (CCl, 2004: 2). The nominated chairman
of the UGCCA steering committee has apparently not attended many meetings (CC4,
2004: 3). His absence may undermine the legitimacy of any decisions that are made
by the remainder of the committee. According to one committee member, the absence
of the nominee does, however, allow the remaining committee members to apparently
function under a less hierarchal structure when the chairman is not present, and seems
to make the decision making process more democratic and open, which has meant
members are less intimidated to put their real views across (CC4, 2004: 3). The
possible reasons for the chairman's absence at these meetings is not very clear and
further research would need to be carried out to ascertain why. More research, by
interviewing a broader sample of steering committee members, would also have to be
conducted to determine whether meetings are actually more open and democratic
without the appointed chairman.
This chapter now moves on to illustrate some of the similarities and differences
between the UGCCA and the MCGR experiences. It also emphasises how the
UGCCA initiative has benefited from the knowledge gained from the MCGR, and
what processes have been implemented to make the project more socially and
economically sustainable in order for the CBC project to achieve its conservation
alms.
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6.5. UGCCA: Toward Social Sustainability
Like the MCGR, the issue of gaining community trust was a long drawn out process
at the UGCCA. Community members accepted the concept of CBC in principle, but
were very cautious to act due to the fact that the Mathenjwa Authority straddles the
edge of the Ndumu Reserve and is near to the Tembe Elephant Park, which both
epitomize fortress conservation practices with limited community involvement and no
access to non-paying members of the community (CC3, 2004: 1). After a long series
of meetings and discussions with the community, The Wi1dlands Trust was pivotal in
ensuring that the community acted on its rhetoric and took the initiative to implement
a CBC scheme at Usuthu Gorge. This was physically demonstrated at one particular
meeting, when the CEO of the Wi1d1ands Trust actually got up and jumped off a table,
demonstrating the fact that simply talking about the concept was not going to achieve
beneficial physical results for the community without taking a significant leap into
action (CC3, 2004: 1).
Due to the community's hesitation and lack of trust, it became imperative for the
project implementers to assure the community that they owned the initiative right
from the start and that, as a result of the reserve, there would not be a negative impact
on their lives. As a trust building initiative, and to ensure the community that the
fences were merely 'to keep wild animals in and not people out,' it was decided that
the reserve should have an open access policy to community members, and that the
small plots of arable farm land along the river within the reserve would be allowed to
continue to be farmed so as not to detract from peoples livelihood strategies (Figure 5)
(CCF, 2004: 1). These policies were essential as they recognise the fact that 'people
must be made better off, not worse off' as a result of the CBC initiative (CCF, 2004:
1).
Evidence suggests that these trust building strategies have paid off. For example, the
community, scared of a disguised land grab by KZN Wildlife who runs the
neighbouring Ndumu Game Reserve, wanted to make the fenced corridor linking both
reserves as narrow as possible in order to create a buffer zone between the two
reserves (CC3, 2004: 2). However, conservation experts argued that a narrow
corridor, would not allow enough animals through to restock the Usuthu Gorge
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reserve. The community continued to insist that the fenced corridor should be no more
than 100 metres wide. It has since been decided by the community, upon realizing
over time that their livelihood strategies have not been negatively affected by the
reserve's fences, and that they are in control of major decisions concerning the
reserve, that the inner corridor fence should be dropped giving more land over to the
new reserve and decreasing the conservation buffer zone with the Ndumu Park.
6.6.1. UGCCA: Toward Sustainable Livelihood Strategies
Barnes (2002: 285) pointed out that areas with high non-use values that contained
wildlife, such as UGCCA, could have a complimentary, rather then competitive role
to play in development in relation to other land-uses (Figure 4). The previous land use
of the UGCCA was mainly farming of traditional livestock and a few plots of arable
land along the Usuthu River, which forms the northern boundary of the reserve. In
order not to diminish these livelihood strategies of the local Mathenjwa people,
several measures were taken by the project implementers to ensure that the reserve
compliments and enhances livelihood strategies rather than competes with them.
6.6.2. Providing Resources for Alternative Livelihood Strategies
One of the existing livelihood strategies was cattle farming and it was decided by the
Usuthu steering committee not to allow cattle grazing within the new reserve as a
result of potential cross contamination of disease with wild animals. The issue of
losing grazing territory to the reserve was of no real concern due to the large areas of
spare community land available for this purpose, however, access to water for the
cattle was. A windmill was subsequently erected outside the reserve, with the
financial support of the Peace Parks Foundation, to provide water for cattle herders
cut off from the river by the reserve's new fences (CCF, 2004: 1). This initiative,
along with the fact that the arable plots of land along the river were allowed to stay,
meant that the pre-existing livelihood strategies of the local people were not
diminished. The obvious hope is that these livelihood strategies would be
complimented by direct and indirect social benefits accruing from tourist generated
income accruing from the existence of the new reserve.
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6.6.3. Expanding Activities within the CBC Project
In order to improve the social and economic status of women in the Mathenjwa
community the project hopes to exploit the potential arrival of tourists in the Usuthu
area. The Wildlands Trust is currently proposing a joint-venture agreement with the
Siya Siza Trust based in Johannesburg and Kubulani Crafts to train women in the
making of arts and crafts to sell to tourists (CC4, 2004: 3). By focusing on one of the
most vulnerable and neglected sectors of the community, namely women, these
handicraft initiatives aim to enhance an essential social CBC principle by focusing on
the poorest people in the community, as they are the ones with the greatest need
(DEAT, 2003: 28). A study of the Vulamehlo Handcraft Project involving the
Hambrook community living on the edge of the Spioenkop Nature Reserve in KZN,
found that such initiatives provided women with an identity within the community, as
well as other non-tangible benefits obtained from regular meetings (socialising,
learning handicrafts skills, discussing prices, etc), which were identified as significant
social benefits gained by the project members (Kruger and Verster, 2001: 245). Prior
to the Vulamehlo Handcraft project, 46% of the women involved had no income, 23%
had their pensions only and 31 % had an alternative income (Kruger and Verster,
2001: 248). These figures emphasise the importance of such ventures towards
enhancing the economic and social status of women within rural communities. In
order to increase the economic returns from the handicrafts produced at Vulamehlo, it
was suggested that more markets other than the local tourist market of the area needed
to be found to sell the products (Kruger and Verster, 2001: 245). In the UGCCA case,
possible export markets, similar to the Mabaso Ilala scheme that intends to supply
Durban, could be tapped for the crafts produced by the Usuthu community.
According to Kruger and Verster (2001) an unexpected advantage of the Vulamehlo
Handcraft Project was the establishment of a line of communication between
members of the community, namely women, who are often sidelined and not included
by traditional decision making processes and the KwaZulu-Natal Nature Conservation
service that runs the Spioenkop Nature Reserve (Kruger and Verster, 2001: 250).
Similar beneficial communication lines may be developed at Usuthu, once the
handicraft projects for women get underway, in order to enhance the communication
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networks that have proven to be a weakness m both the UGCCA and MCGR
initiatives so far.
6.6.4. Building skills in the community
The erection of the fence at Usuthu has probably been the project's biggest success
story to date in terms of enhancing community ownership, as well as adding to the
livelihood strategies of community members through the creation of jobs. Unlike the
Mabaso project, where outside contractors were hired to erect the fences surrounding
the reserve, the Usuthu Steering committee took it upon themselves to organise and
co-ordinate the fence implementation phase. With the help and advice of a fencing
'fundi' from KZN Wildlife, an initial ten community members from the most affected
wards were trained to construct a two-kilometre stretch of fencing. Once this two-
ki10meter stretch was completed, the first ten community members trained another ten
members to continue on with a further two ki10meters of fence construction. This
process was repeated until the initial ten ki10meter phase of fence implementation was
completed (CC3, 2004: 1). The only funding condition of this process was that the
labour groups chosen had to be gender equitable.
The overall fencing system meant that instead of having one team erect the whole
fence, as was the case at Mabaso, there were to be five teams of ten, which meant that
the benefits of the employment created were more widely and equitably spread. The
benefits could have been spread further if, like the Mavhu1ani Bush Camp, no
husband and wife combinations were employed in order to further ensure the spread
of benefits to more than one family (Vi1joen and Naicker, 2000: 143). Additionally,
the direction of the fence was entirely decided on by the community (CC1, 2004: 2).
The successful implementation of the fence did a lot to augment the relationship
between the steering committee and the broader community through their realization
that they could achieve large tasks on their own (CC4, 2004: 1).
6.7. UGCCA: Toward Economic Sustainability
Bames (2002: 285) stated that areas with high non-use values, which usually include
regions of scenic and biological diversity, offered wildlife conservation the best
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opportunities for maximizing economIC returns through nature-based tourism
ventures. The UGCCA, due to its remoteness, scenic and biological diversity and
fenced corridor link to the Ndumu Game Reserve, which allows the migration of
animals between the two conservation zones, satisfies the criteria deemed necessary
for the economic viability of conservation areas outlined in Bames' model (Figure 5).
The tourist concessions that are being considered at Usuthu, in order to increase the
financial sustainability of the reserve, are tourism accommodation, hunting in
designated areas of the reserve, 4x4 trails on selected roads, game viewing and
walking trails (CCF, 2004: 1). As Usuthu is less accessible than Mabaso, it is intended
to attract longer-term tourists, as opposed to day visitors. Expressions of interest for
the various tourist concessions will be advertised, and interested developers will have
to submit a project proposal to the reserve's steering committee for review (CC4,
2004: 3). The steering committee will then select a number of competing expressions
of interest that are considered to be the most beneficial in terms of enhancing the
community through employment and training opportunities. This is a similar process
used by the Damaraland Camp in Namibia (Jones, 2001: 172), where through a
careful negotiated bidding process, beneficial contracts were agreed upon, such as
managerial training for community members and agreements for the community to
take over the running of the initiatives after a given period of time (Jones, 2001: 172).
The bids for tourist concessions at the UGCCA will then be submitted to the Tribal
Authority, which will then choose the specific tenders they prefer (CC4, 2004: 3). By
going through the steering committee the process is designed to be more transparent
and hopes to avoid the possibility of corruption such as those tendering offering
bribes straight to the tribal authority (CC4, 2004: 3).
The concession for hunting in the UGCCA, despite the controversy surrounding the
consumptive use of resources as a sustainable means of enhancing the reserve's
chances of survival, will provide a comparative advantage over the neighboring
Ndumu Game Reserve that does not allow hunting. The UGCCA steering committee
has decided that the sustainable off-take of individual animals in the future is a
utilitarian need necessary to achieve the overall economic and biological
sustainability of the reserve (CCF, 2004: 2). This also means that the UGCCA can
target a slightly different type of clientele, and will not have to compete outright in the
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same market niche with the Ndumu Reserve. It is important to note that hunting only
makes up a small part of the overall income generating strategy of the UGCCA, and
as is planned at Mabaso, will only occur in certain designated areas of the reserve so
as not to disturb other tourist activities.
6.8. Summary
It is worth re-emphasising that the UGCCA project has benefited a great deal from the
experiences encountered by the Wildlands Trust as a result of its involvement with the
Mabaso Community Conservation Reserve. Consequently, the UGCCA project has a
specific project manager, providing professional advice on a long-term and constant
basis. Additionally, the local community is doing the erection of the reserve's fence
with different groups doing different sections so as to spread the benefits of
employment throughout the community; as opposed to an outside contractor coming
in and hiring one group of local community members, as was the case at Mabaso. The
UGCCA project has also benefited from clearly defined property rights with no
conflicting debates between communities about who owns the land. This will no
doubt prove to be very beneficial when it comes to tendering the various concessions
to private investors who are attracted by a stable local political climate. The UGCCA
also benefits from its close proximity and linking corridor with the Ndumu Game
Reserve in terms of increasing the new reserves animal stocks and marketing needs
for this remote area. In terms of competition, the UGCCA will offer concessions that
are not available at the Ndumu Game Reserve such as walking, camping and hunting.
As was the case at the MCGR, communication between the UGCCA steering
committee and local community has been cited as a problem in terms of speeding up
the project's progress. The debate about the incorporation of the tribal authority
structure is also an issue with the UGCCA project, with the Inkhosi's appointed
steering committee chairman apparently rarely attending meetings. This has had an
apparent positive effect, as the hierarchal structure of the steering committee has been
diminished, which means that the rest of the steering committee members are more
confident about putting their ideas forward. However, in order to determine how open
these meetings really are as a result of the chairman's absence, further interviews
would need to take place with a broader range of steering committee members.
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Interestingly, the UGCCA experience has also illustrated the need to sell the CBC
concept, not only to local communities but also to established conservationists that
still view the square wheel approach of fortress conservation as the only way of





This thesis began with an overview of the theory behind community-based conservation
initiatives. The basic premise being that local people will stop exploiting resources within
reserves or communal areas if they achieve increasing incomes or are otherwise
economically compensated for opportunity costs in return for the limited resource use of
certain areas. The CBC concept further advocates that through the sustainable use of
resources, often involving nature-based tourism initiatives, communities can be enhanced
and empowered both economically and socially, making CBC initiatives potential
development tools for poor communities living in communal areas.
An objective of this study was to identify and confirm necessary criteria for the successful
implementation of CBC initiatives. This study found that all of DEAT' s principles and
criteria (see table 1) and Ostrom's principles for sustaining common property institutions
(see table 2) had been taken into consideration at both the MCGR and UGCCA projects.
For example, ensuring a variety of different ways for communities to earn a living and to
minimise disruption by CBC projects of pre-existing livelihood strategies carried out by
local residents; guaranteeing that the natural resource base of an area is maintained and
even improved for future generations; making sure local organisations, including local
government and community organisations work effectively together to manage local
resources for the benefit of local people and the environment; ensuring that communities
receive real benefits - economic, social, cultural and spiritual - from managing natural
resources wisely; implementing effective policies and laws, where ever possible, by
legitimate and representative local organisations; providing outside assistance to facilitate
local projects and to ensure the development of the necessary skills for local communities
to eventually take on the initiatives themselves; as well as a good understanding of local
leadership and the gaining of support by local leadership for CBC projects have all been, to
some extent, put into practice or tested at the MCGR and UGCCA project sites; evidence
of which shall be summarised in this chapter. Clearly defined property rights, as well as
conflict resolution mechanisms are further essential criteria that have played important
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roles in shaping the implementation processes at both the project areas, especially the
MCGR.
The most important of the criteria identified within this study was the need to gain the
broad based support of local communities affected by CBC initiatives. Critics of the CBC
concept argue that the concept is based on tenuous assumptions about human behaviour,
often assuming that rural communities are homogenous in nature in terms of the benefits
they derive from their surrounding environment (Leach, Meams and Scoones, 1999: 229).
This means that in reality conservation efforts are likely to impact positively on certain
individuals and negatively on others within communities. Little consideration is given to
individuals within communities and the motives they might have to work against
community-based conservation programs. Furthermore, while community-based
conservation can function in heterogeneous communities, an understanding of community
is necessary in order to determine appropriate and realistic incentives for conservation. It is
for this reason that both the MCGR and UGCCA projects followed a long-term ten-year
implementation plan (Figure 6) with a significant amount of time being designated towards
gaining the perceptions, ideas and demands from the respective local communities, as well
as understanding and learning their livelihood strategies (CCF, 2004: 2).
Each community, as well as being heterogeneous in nature, is different from the next
community in terms of their outlook and problems they face. This means that each
community requires a specific strategy when it comes to successfully implementing a CBC
initiative. Various differences between the Mabaso and the Mathenjwa communities
emphasise this. For example, the Mabaso community was experiencing a conflict with the
neighbouring Mbila community over land rights, which was cited as one potential reason
for the vandalism of the reserve fences. A strategy to over come this conflict proposed that
the Mbila community become shareholders in the lodge development plans, thus giving
them an economic incentive to help the new reserve succeed (CCl, 2004: 3). A further
example of differences between communities is that the Inkhosi of the Mathenjwa people
took a less active role in the decision making process of the UGCCA initiative then was the
case at MCGR. Due to a lack of further research, it was hard to determine whether this
would have a positive or negative impact on the decision making process. It can be argued
that as the Inkhosi is the leader and head representative of the community, it is vital that he
is involved in the process in order to add extra impetus to the proceedings. A counter
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perspective given, was that the Inkhosi's absence meant that more open, productive and
democratic meetings were held (CC4, 2004:3).
The second most important criteria identified by this study was the need to have a broad
based involvement of the community in the implementation process in order to ensure that
the community feels a part of, and is in charge of, the process. At both the MCGR and
UGCCA, community members were involved with the decision making process through
their ward representatives on the respective steering committees. Middle of the month
meetings had been proposed at the MCGR, where only the community representatives of
the steering committee meet with out the technical expertise of the Wildlands Trust in order
to gain more independence in the decision making process (CCF, 2004: 2). The
community must also be involved in the building of necessary infrastructure for the
reserves so that they gain a sense of achievement, as well as a wage for their labour. The
erection of the game fence at the UGCCA is a good example of this, whereby different
groups of community members constructed different segments of the fence, consequently
spreading the benefits of employment through out the community and created the
realisation that big tasks could be achieved by the local community (CC4, 2004: 3).
Interestingly, this type of involvement was not as apparent at the MCGR, which could be a
further explanatory reason for the slower rate of progress and continued vandalism of the
MCGR fences. More research would have to be done, however, to ascertain all the multi-
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faceted reasons for this vandalism and slow progress. The quicker progress and successful
involvement of the community at the UGCCA is partly attributable to the fact that the
Wildlands Trust has gained invaluable experience from the MCGR project and has
assigned a specific technical advisor to the UGCCA project to ensure the process is kept on
track.
Further examples of both the MCGR and UGCCA incorporating DEAT's and Ostrom's
identified criteria include the fact that the rules and regulations of both reserves have been
decided on by the respective steering committees, which are made up of local community
ward representatives, tribal authority members, KZN Wildlife officers and Wildlands Trust
project managers. These rules and regulations are on the whole accepted by the local
communities and have actually been implemented at Mabaso with the aid of the local
police who recognise them as legitimate (CCF, 2004: 3). The inclusion of tribal structures
in both the MCGR and UGCCA steering committees further increases the trust and feeling
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of ownership by the respective communities and brings on board their local leadership to
ensure their support for the projects. There is a danger that the Inkhosis that officially
oversee tribal affairs may be too dictatorial and undemocratic in the decision making
process. There is no apparent evidence of this happening at either the MCGR or UGCCA;
however, more research would need to occur over a longer period of time to confirm this.
Despite further attempts by both projects to gam the support of the community and
incorporate necessary criteria into the implementation phases, the initiatives have
encountered several major challenges to date. Firstly, the analysis of both the MCGR and
UGCCA projects emphasise the length of time it takes to get a CBC project up and
running. This was mainly due to initial community reservations about the project; an
almost non-existent infrastructure base to begin with; a lack of managerial and
organisational skill amongst the local communities and government bureaucracy in the
planning process. Time-consuming factors such as these surmount to a need for a long-term
and realistic implementation time frame in order for CBC projects to start generating
positive results. This means that the donor community needs to support CBC initiatives for
the long-term. Secondly, the MCGR re-emphasised the need for clearly defined property
rights as disputes over tribal boundaries set the project back in terms of time and money.
Thirdly, good communication links between the project management of both initiatives and
the local community was cited as being crucial to getting the broader community on side
and speeding up the whole process. Bad communication structures led to a lot of
uncertainty within the local communities. This led to a lot of mistrust with local
communities seeing the CBC initiative as a disguised form of land grab by
conservationists. Fourthly, an over-reliance on the private sector to deliver on their
promises to attract visitors and fill beds was experienced at the MCGR. Due to the
difficulties faced by rural communities in terms of gaining access to formal credit facilities,
lack of managerial skills and limitations in donor funding, many CBC projects are reliant
on joint ventures between local communities and private investors to run various tourist
concessions in communal areas. An important criterion in order to avoid exploitation and to
maximise any benefits accruing from private investors utilising local community resources
is the development of favourable legal contracts as exemplified by Namibia's Damaraland
Community Camp (Jones, 2001: 172). Both the MCGR and UGCCA communities need to
agree with their respective private investors on a favourable contractual agreement
confirming the terms and conditions necessary to put the investors under a bit of pressure to
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perform, whilst offering enough incentives for private investors to want to invest in the
area.
A further objective of this study was to see how different identified criteria necessary for
successful CBC projects affected the social, economic and biological elements of the
sustainable development model. The economic element relates to increasing people's well
being through job creation and income generating schemes. Socio-cultural factors include
empowering communities to take control of their own destiny in terms of realising the
benefits that can accrue from their own resources in a sustainable manner. This element can
also be enhanced by enabling local communities to take charge of CBC initiatives through
their own elective and decision making processes so as to increase their self determination
and decrease their reliance on the government and NGOs. The biological element refers to
the sustainable conservation and enhancement ofresources and biodiversity of an area. The
new conservation paradigm advocates that the enhancement of the economic and socio-
cultural elements, by creating income generating conservation initiatives, will lead to the
achievement of the biological goals. This research has demonstrated that some of the key
factors in determining success of CBCs include land rights, tenure security, governance,
and democracy and gender equality. These factors are inextricably linked to community
and can therefore be associated with the social element of the sustainable development
model. However, a more complex model of sustainable development that has a fourth
dimension - the institutional dimension - has been used for analysis of livelihoods (Satge,
2002: 5). Given institutional factors, although related to the social element, are so prevalent
in determining the success of the CBC initiative the more complex model may be more
suitable for analysis of CBCs.
Determining people's livelihood strategies and ensuring that these are not diminished, but
in fact enhanced, is crucial in terms of gaining community support of CBC initiatives. At
the MCGR, for example, the harvesting of Ilala plants has been allowed to continue within
the reserve. At the UGCCA, farming plots along the river remain intact and a windmill has
been erected outside the reserve to ensure drinking water for cattle cut off from the river.
Both projects have open access policies whereby, despite the fences, the local community
are allowed into the reserve at all times. The fences are to keep animals in and not people
out (CCl, 2004: 2). These different livelihood strategies re-emphasise the need to learn and
understand local communities and adopt specific project strategies accordingly.
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Plans to enhance the economic situation and diversify the local communities' livelihood
strategies, at both the MCGR and the UGCCA, are to be introduced in addition to the
already intended benefits hoped to accrue from tourist concessions. At the MCGR, these
plans include supplying Ilala leaves directly to Durban, thus cutting out the middle
salesman and ensuring that more money goes to the community that collect the leaves from
the reserve. This is a gender-oriented approach as the majority of Ilala pickers are women.
At the UGCCA, there are also plans to train women in the making of arts and crafts for sale
to tourists. All these incentives are designed to reduce the opportunity costs incurred by
communities of setting up the reserves and to enhance and improve the livelihoods of those
living in the vicinity of the new proj ect areas as well as to increase the gender equity of the
communities by ensuring women benefit from the projects.
7.2. Future Predictions.
Both the MCGR and UGCCA projects have the potential to succeed. The MCGR is very
easily accessible by road and is located close to Sodwana Bay, South Africa's premiere
diving destination, which means that the new reserve could potentially tap into a large pre-
existing tourist market by offering an alternative day trip for divers. The MCGR has a large
non-use value potential as a result of its location on the shores of Lake Sibaya, South
Africa's largest freshwater lake, which has seen very little development along its shores.
Due to the hilly topography and sandy soils, the area does not lend itself to arable farming.
Subsequently, the Lake Sibaya shoreline represents an unspoilt wilderness area, something
of a scarce commodity in South Africa. The lake offers the opportunity for the community
to sell various concessions to tour companies, or indeed to run their own initiatives, in the
form of boat cruises, kayaking and fishing with permits. The Greater St. Lucia Wetlands
Park, in which the MCGR is situated, has been promised large investments in tourist
ventures and infrastructure by DEAT and private investors, further increasing the profile
and marketing potential of the area.
The UGCCA also has a lot of potential for success. Firstly, the UGCCA location is remoter
than the MCGR and is presently only accessible by four-wheel drive vehicles. This offers
visitors to the area a true wilderness experience that satisfies Barnes's (2002) pre-requisites
of low disturbance, high biodiversity and remote locations for the success of community
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conservation projects. Secondly, the UGCCA is situated next to, and shares a corridor link,
with the Ndumu Game Reserve that allows the free movement of wildlife between the two
conservation areas. Thirdly, the UGCCA intends to offer concessions, like hunting, that are
not in direct competition with the Ndumu Reserve. Fourthly, the Mathenjwa community
involved with the UGCCA initiative have secure property rights to the area as a result of a
recent land restitution claim. Fifthly, evidence so far suggests that the community is in full
support of the initiative, which is emphasised by their desire to remove the inner fence of
the corridor link in order to increase the conservation buffer zone. Finally, the UGCCA
project has benefited a great deal from the Wildlands Trust's previous experiences at the
MCGR. This is exemplified by the fact that the UGCCA project has been assigned a full
time specific project manager by the Wildlands Trust and that some of the jobs created by
the CBC initiative, like putting up the fencing, were distributed more widely and equitably
through out the entire community.
After completing the fieldwork for this research project both CBC initiatives have
received inputs that have propelled them to 'another level'. According to Andrew
Venter from the Wildlands Trust, the MCGR was signing an agreement with a
funding partner and the UGCCA application for poverty relief funds was successful.
Such economic inputs are likely to contribute to the success and sustainability of the
two initiatives.
7.3. Further Research and Limitations of Study
Hulme and Murphree (2001) identified two major gaps in knowledge with regards to
community based conservation initiatives. Firstly, research is required to determine
whether these community oriented approaches to conservation are improving the
livelihoods of rural Africans who have borne the costs of 'fortress conservation' for
\
decades and who are often among the poorest people in the world. Secondly, it has been
further recognised that additional research is also required to ascertain whether these
approaches are raising the likelihood of the conservation of African wildlife (Hulme and
Murphree, 2001: 2).
This study focused mainly on the implementation of CBC initiatives and the necessary
criteria needed to make these projects sustainable in the long run. It can be argued,
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however, that the real challenge for the sustainability of CBC projects will come after the
implementation phases. For this reason, further research would be required once the
projects are properly up and running to monitor what the actual real benefits, if any, are to
the community. How are these benefits distributed amongst the community? Who decides
how they are distributed? Is the process democratic? What contractual agreements between
the community and the private investors were eventually decided on? Will there still be a
need for donor support and outside technical advice?
Moves to give communities more ownership over resources raised questions of how far '
power should be devolved. Should local district councils that tend to be more democratic in \
nature in comparison to traditional authorities be responsible for receiving and distributing
benefits generated by CBC initiatives; or should these responsibilities be left to traditional
structures, such as tribal authorities that tend to be undemocratic and male oriented in
nature. The former method was used in Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE initiative and was found
to create additional layers of bureaucracy and corruption (lones and Murphree, 2001: 45),
whilst the latter method was used in Zambia's ADMADE programme, which experienced
nepotism when it came to local chiefs distributing the benefits of the project (Gibson and
Marking, 1995: 646). As the MCGR and UGCCA both use traditional structures, it is hard
to determine from this study what method, between traditional authority and local
government structures, is the most progressive for CBC initiatives, and whether an
alternative method altogether is available. A more comparative research study of CBC
projects that use different institutional structures would need to be carried out to determine
the different impacts of either traditional authority or local government institutional
structures.
There is also a danger that any benefits created by CBC initiatives may create in-migration
into that area putting additional pressure on resources. Several CAMPFIRE wards in
Zimbabwe experienced this phenomenon to the extent that local people actively
encouraged in-migration in order to gain more government recognition for development
investment. Conservation was therefore seen as a short-term solution to encouraging the
long-term development that would eventually be biologically unsustainable. Inevitably, if
this pattern is repeated in other CBC areas, then a hybridisation of fortress conservation and
the new conservation paradigm will have to occur in order to maintain the biological
element of the sustainable development model. Further research would have to occur at
100
both the MCGR and UGCCA project sites once economic benefits start accruing to see
whether an in-migration pattern occurs.
Due to a lack of time and access, a general weakness of this study is the absence of donor
perspectives on funding CBC initiatives. For example, why are donors interested in CBC
projects? Do they appreciate the long-term time frames necessary for CBC initiatives?
What institutional procedures would they like to see implemented and why?
7.4. Conclusion.
It is clear from the findings in this research that community-based conservation initiatives
aimed at achieving both conservation and development goals face a number of challenges
that could, if not taken into consideration, undermine the long-term sustainability of such
projects. CBC projects require specific locations and the right criteria to be in place for
their successful implementation. Not all communities or communal areas meet these
criteria, which is why CBC should be seen more as an important and necessary supplement
to conservation strategies as opposed to a holistic conservation policy tool. This research
demonstrates that implementing CBC is difficult but that obstacles can be overcome and
avoided especially through learning from previous experiences; however, there is still a
need for the right inputs and criteria for sustainability to be in place, which means that
some fortress conservation may be necessary to protect large tracts of land in the
foreseeable future. However, based on findings from this project this author argues that
CBC initiatives can make an important contribution to the conservation and development
of certain areas at grass-root levels. For this reason, CBC initiatives should be encouraged
and enhanced in areas where institutional factors can be moulded to achieve biological,
economic and social goals of sustainable development, with one of the critical aims being
to improve the livelihood strategies of poor people.
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Plate 1. The Mabaso Tribal Court House
Plate 2. I1ala Leaf (Hyphanae Coriaces) Products
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Plate 3. The Mabaso Community Game Reserve Warehouse.
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